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Abstract
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stock market’s expected return and volatility increase as more investor capital
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1 Introduction
The fund management industry has grown significantly in the past few decades.1 Reflect-
ing that, recently more and more papers have analyzed economic implications of delegated
portfolio management. While some have considered asset-pricing implications and others
have considered contracting implications, few have studied both in a unified model. The
goal of this paper is to develop a tractable model of such a kind and draw empirical
implications from the equilibrium relations of delegation and asset prices.
Our model has two distinguishing features compared to the existing ones. First, fund
fees are determined in optimal contracting problems and interact with equilibrium stock
prices. The fee arrangement serves as an optimal scheme of sharing portfolio risk among
fund managers and fund investors, linking the principal-agent relationship in portfolio
delegation and the stock market performance. Second, our model incorporates strategic
behavior of both fund managers and fund investors in an asset-pricing model. This feature
creates a feedback loop between both of these agents’ optimal investment decisions and
the stock market performance, allowing us to derive a rich set of predictions on the time
variation of stock returns, fund returns, fund fees, fund flows, and investment strategies.
Specifically, we consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model with a risky stock and
a riskless asset. The stock yields a normally distributed dividend each period, and the
price is determined by market clearing. The riskless asset has an infinitely elastic supply
at an exogenous rate of return and is freely accessible to all agents. There are three types
of agents: direct investors, fund investors, and fund managers. All of them are risk-averse
(CARA) price takers who live for two periods, constituting overlapping generations. The
direct investors can access the stock on their own, whereas the fund investors cannot.
To invest in the stock, the fund investors need to delegate capital to a fund manager
who manages a portfolio of the assets on their behalf. This delegation is subject to an
agency problem: potentially, each manager can abscond with the fund investors’ assets.
To prevent it from happening, the fund investors offer to the manager a fee contract
that is attractive enough for him to continue running the fund rather than abscond. The
model’s key endogenous variables are (1) fund size, measured by assets under management
1Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) report that in the U.S. as of 2004, mutual funds managed assets more than
$8 trillion, hedge funds managed about $1 trillion and pension funds more than $12 trillion. According
to Investment Company Institute (2014), in the U.S., the number of households owning mutual funds
has increased from 23.4 million in 1990 to 56.7 million in 2013. In 2012, 23% of households’ financial
assets are managed by registered investment companies (household holdings of ETFs, closed-end funds,
unit investment trusts, and mutual funds), while that proportion was only 3% in 1980.
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(AUM), (2) fund’s risk exposure, measured by the number of shares of the stock held per
dollar of investor capital, (3) fund’s fee schedule, which we allow to be any function of
the fund’s investment profit (i.e., the proceeds from the fund portfolio in excess of the
riskless component), and (4) the stock price.
The model’s equilibrium involves a feedback loop among these endogenous variables:
fund investors and managers take into account the fee schedule when choosing the capital
allocation and the fund’s risk exposure, while the fee schedule depends on these agents’
choices, and the stock price adjusts to make certain all these actions are consistent with
market clearing. Due to the CARA-normal specification, the optimal fee schedule is (not
surprisingly) in an affine form. The stock price, the fund’s risk exposure, and AUM are
all stochastically time varying, reflecting random shocks to the stock supply. This feature
allows us to study issues of significant interest such as stock price volatility, time variations
of fund trading strategies and fund flows, and their interactions with stock market return.
All solutions are obtained in simple closed form.
The model yields a number of testable predictions. It predicts that the expected
stock market return and the stock price volatility increase with the extent of delegation
as measured by the proportion of fund investors. The intuition is as follows. As more
investors delegate capital to funds, the AUM per fund also increases. Consequently, each
fund manager is exposed to a larger market risk because he receives a fee proportional to
the fund’s investment profit that increases with the AUM and varies with the stochastic
stock-market performance. To compensate this risk bearing, each manager demands a
larger risk premium, leading to a higher expected stock market return in equilibrium.
Moreover, as the AUM increases, each fund’s demand for the stock becomes less price-
elastic because the manager tries to reduce the variation of the fund’s stock holding to
counterbalance his personal risk bearing. In equilibrium, the aggregate demand with
lower price elasticity, being equated to a random supply, yields a market-clearing price
with higher volatility. To see the intuition, consider the classical demand-supply diagram
with price on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal axis. Low price elasticity
means that the slope of the downward-sloping demand curve is steep. Thus, as the vertical
supply curve fluctuates due to the supply shocks, the resulting market-clearing price at
the intersection of these two curves exhibits large volatility.
Furthermore, the model provides explanations to the empirical observations such as
(1) a positive relation between aggregate fund flows and subsequent stock returns and a
negative relation between returns and subsequent flows (Warther 1995), and (2) mutual
funds’ counter-cyclical volatility timing, that is, they decrease their market exposure when
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market volatility is high (Busse 1999; Giambona and Golec 2009). Also, we distinguish
market return and fund return, identify their distributions, and offer new testable impli-
cations on their equilibrium relations: (1) the expected fund return is less volatile than
the expected market return, and (2) the fund return volatility comoves negatively with
the market return volatility, that is, funds provide investors with a volatility hedge.
Last, we study a model with infinitely-lived agents. While the analysis is less tractable
due to the agents’ hedging considerations, we show that all the qualitative results obtained
in the overlapping-generations model still carry through in such a setting.
This paper relates to the growing literature that discusses equilibrium implications
of delegated portfolio management (Allen and Gorton 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997;
Vayanos 2004; Malliaris and Yan 2012; Basak and Pavlova 2012; Vayanos and Woolley
2013; Sato 2014). The following papers especially relate to this paper.
Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley (2014) is most closely related, as they also study the joint
determination of fund fees and asset prices. They focus on fund managers’ contractual
incentives and their impact on fund strategies, and do not study investors’ endogenous
capital allocation (i.e., AUM). In contrast, in our model both contractual incentives and
AUM play critical roles. It is key for our results that investors’ strategic choices of AUM
and managers’ choices of fund strategies interact with each other.2
He and Krishnamurthy (2012) study the relation between portfolio delegation and
asset prices in a dynamic setting. In their model, the intermediary’s capital scarcity in
the “crisis” situation is central to the equilibrium characterization. In contrast, all of
our results hold in non-crisis situations; the driving forces are fee contracts and strategic
interactions between fund investors and managers, both of which are absent in their model.
Like our paper, Kaniel and Kondor (2013) study equilibrium asset prices and trading
strategies of fund managers with concern for fund flows. While the investors’ capital
provision is exogenous in their paper, in ours it is one of the main endogenous variables for
which we draw empirical implications. Also, their model does not discuss the optimality
of fees or the volatility of asset prices, which are main focus of our paper.
Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) relates to our paper in that they also study the asset pricing
implications of delegated portfolio management. While the fee structure in their model
is exogenously imposed, it is optimal in ours. Also, while investors’ capital provision and
fee payment occur only once in their model, in ours they take place continually; thus, we
can study the time variation of fund flows and fees.
2Moreover, while Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley (2014) assume an affine form of fees and determine
the optimal parameter values, in ours the affine form is endogenously obtained.
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Ou-Yang (2003) is related to ours, as he also derives a fee contract in a portfolio
delegation problem. In his model, asset prices are exogenously given, whereas they are
endogenous in ours; studying the equilibrium interaction between asset prices and fees is
the primary purpose of our paper. Also, his model takes the investor’s capital provision
as exogenous and does not discuss the fund’s asset size, which is our focus in this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes
the benchmark case without delegation. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium with dele-
gation. Section 5 discusses the empirical implications. Section 6 studies a model with
long-lived agents. Section 7 concludes. The proofs and robustness checks are in the online
appendix.
2 Model
Time t is discrete and runs from zero to infinity. There is a single consumption good
referred to as a dollar. There is a risky stock and a riskless asset. The riskless asset has
an infinitely elastic supply at an exogenous rate of return r > 0 and is freely accessible
to all agents.3 There are three types of agents: fund investors, direct investors, and fund
managers. All of them are risk averse and competitive (i.e., price takers). They live
for two periods and constitute overlapping generations.4 The fund investors can access
the stock only through fund managers, who collect fees from the investors. The direct
investors access the stock on their own. The fee schedule, the investors’ capital allocation,
the managers’ portfolio choice, and the stock price are determined endogenously.
2.1 Stock
In each period t = 1, 2, ..., the stock yields a dividend δt per share, which is i.i.d. across
time, normally distributed with mean δˆ > 0 and variance σ2 > 0. The stock is traded in
the market at market-clearing price Pt. The stock’s supply St stochastically evolves over
time as St = St−1 + t, where noise t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
3It is standard in the literature to assume an exogenous, constant riskless rate in models with CARA-
normal asset-pricing models (see, for example, Wang 1993, Spiegel 1998, Watanabe 2008, Banerjee 2011,
and Vayanos and Woolley 2013). Moreover, Sundaresan (1983) provides a justification for a constant
interest rate in a general equilibrium model with CARA agents. In Appendix G.1, we endogeneize the
risk-free rate in the fixed supply case and show that our main result still carries through.
4The assumption of overlapping generations simplifies the analysis and allows us to obtain intuitive
closed-form solutions. But the assumption is not critical to our main results. Section 6 presents a model
with infinitely-lived agents and shows that all of our qualitative results still go through.
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σ2s ≥ 0.5 Due to the stochastic nature of St, the price and agents’ actions will be time
varying in equilibrium.6 We denote the stock’s excess return per share of the stock by
Rt+1 ≡ δt+1 + Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt. (2.1)
2.2 Agents
In each period t, a continuum with mass one of investors and a continuum with mass
β > 0 of fund managers are born (“generation t”). Each investor is endowed with W > 0
dollars. An exogenous proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of investors are fund investors, and the rest
are direct investors. Each manager has zero endowment and runs an investment fund. Two
parameters (α, β), representing the extent of portfolio delegation in the economy, are key
comparative statics parameters in the following analysis. The letters “f ,” “d,” and “m”
are used to represent fund investors, direct investors, and fund managers, respectively.
The generation-t agents make investment decisions in period t and derive utility from
their terminal wealth in period t + 1. Each agent has a utility function ui(W it+1) =
− exp(−γiW it+1), i ∈ {f,m, d}, where W it+1 is her/his terminal wealth and γi > 0 is a
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. When α → 0 and β → 0, the equilibrium of our
model converges to that of Spiegel (1998) where delegation is irrelevant.
2.3 Portfolio management
For simplicity, we assume that fund investors are equally allocated across funds, that is,
each fund has a mass α/β of investors.7 Each fund investor allocates Xt ≥ 0 dollars of
capital to the fund in period t, where Xt is an endogenous variable. Given Xt dollars
of capital, the manager purchases θtXt shares of the stock, where θt ∈ (−∞,∞) is also
endogenously determined. We refer to θt as the fund’s risk exposure. The rest of the
5The assumption that St is a random walk simplifies the analysis but is stronger than necessary. Any
AR(1) process St = a0 + a1St−1 + t, where a0 ≥ 0 and a1 ∈ [0, 1] are constants and t is a normally
distributed noise, would preserve all the results qualitatively. See Appendix G.2 for details.
6It is standard to study price volatility by assuming random stock supply. See Spiegel (1998), Watan-
abe (2008), and Banerjee (2011) for overlapping generations models, and Campbell and Kyle (1993) and
Wang (1993) for infinitely lived agent models. We could alternatively assume a fixed stock supply k > 0
and a stochastic demand (k − St) from noise traders.
7This assumption is micro-founded in Appendix G.3. We allow fund investors to choose funds to
which to allocate capital, and show that they flow in and out of funds until each fund has accommodated
a mass α/β of investors. Moreover, Appendix G.3 shows that fund managers are “perfectly competitive”
in attracting investors in the sense that each manager takes the mass of fund investors choosing his fund
as given, as he cannot strategically influence the investors’ choices of funds through his actions.
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Figure 1: Timeline of portfolio management (generation-t fund).
investor capital, (Xt−PtθtXt) dollars, is invested in the riskless asset.8,9 Since the fund’s
portfolio holding (given Pt) is described completely by θt and Xt, we refer to the pair
(θt, Xt) as the fund’s investment profile.
10 In period t+ 1, the fund receives dividend δt+1
and then sells the stock in the market (to the agents of generation t + 1) at price Pt+1.
Thus, the total proceeds from the fund portfolio (per investor) is
Yt+1 ≡ Πt+1 + (1 + r)Xt (2.2)
dollars, where
Πt+1 ≡ Rt+1θtXt (2.3)
is the proceeds in excess of the riskless component (1+r)Xt that each fund investor could
have obtained on her own without delegation.11 We refer to Πt+1 as the fund profit.
8If 1 > Ptθt, the manager buys the riskless asset, while if 1 < Ptθt, he sells the asset (i.e., borrows
funds) to finance the purchase of the stock.
9In reality, there are a number of passively managed funds, such as index funds, in which the managers
do not have discretion over portfolio choice. In such funds, the managers commit to choose θt = 1/Pt
and do not buy the riskless asset. In Appendix G.4, we show that these passive funds would coexist with
our model’s funds, even if each fund investor is allowed to choose a fund to which to allocate capital.
10We implicitly assume that the managers are not allowed to invest their own capital (borrowed at
rate r) in their funds. However, as shown in Appendix G.5, even if they were allowed to do so, they would
choose not to invest any capital. The reason is as follows. Suppose that a manager can invest Zt ≥ 0
dollars in his fund. Then, given Xt, he has two choice variables, θt and Zt, to control the fund’s stock
holding, θt(Xt +Zt). From the manager’s perspective, choosing Zt > 0 entails a borrowing cost, whereas
choosing θt > 0 is costless. Thus, he optimally sets Zt = 0, and uses only θt to control the stock holding.
11Yt+1 is computed as follows. In period t, each fund investor invests Xt dollars in the fund. The
manager buys θtXt shares of the stock (i.e., pays PtθtXt dollars for the purchase) and invests (Xt−PtθtXt)
dollars in the riskless asset. In period t+1, per investor, the fund receives δt+1θtXt dollars of payoff from
the stock, Pt+1θtXt dollars from selling that stock in the market, and (1 + r)(Xt − PtθtXt) dollars from
the riskless asset. Thus, the total proceeds from the fund portfolio per investor is Yt+1 = δt+1θtXt +
Pt+1θtXt + (1 + r)(Xt − PtθtXt) = Rt+1θtXt + (1 + r)Xt = Πt+1 + (1 + r)Xt.
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2.4 Fee contract
In period t, in each fund, the generation-t fund investors collectively offer a fee contract
to the manager in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. The contract specifies the fee payment
schedule contingent on the fund profit Πt+1, denoted by Ft(Πt+1), where Ft(·) can be any
function. The agents determine Ft(·) and (θt, Xt) simultaneously (Figure 1).12
The assumption that the fee depends only on Πt+1 is stronger than necessary. In
Appendix G.6, we show that all the results, including the fee schedule itself, would be
identical to those of this model even if we allow for a larger contract space that includes
not only Πt+1 but also Rt+1 and Yt+1.
13
We model an agency friction between the fund manager and investors as follows. In
period t, after Ft(·) is determined and the fund portfolio is formed, the manager can
choose whether to continue running the fund or abscond with a part of the fund portfolio
(Figure 1). If he chooses to continue, he will receive fee Ft(Πt+1) from each of his fund’s
investors in period t+ 1. Since there is a mass α/β of investors in each fund, his terminal
wealth in this case is
Wmt+1 =
α
β
Ft(Πt+1). (2.4)
Each fund investor’s terminal wealth in this case is
W ft+1 = Yt+1 − Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)(W −Xt), (2.5)
where the first two terms on the right-hand side (RHS) are the after-fee proceeds from
the fund, and the third term is the proceeds from the riskless asset she bought on her
own. If the manager chooses to abscond, he can do so with a fraction ξ ∈ (0, 1) of the
fund portfolio, where ξ measures the degree of agency friction. His terminal wealth in
12The timing of the choices of Ft(·) and (θt, Xt) is not important. When solving for the equilibrium in
Section 4, we will first determine the optimal Ft(Πt+1) for an arbitrary (θt, Xt); then, taking this Ft(Πt+1)
as given, determine the optimal (θt, Xt). Hence, our solutions coincide with those of an alternative setting
in which each period t has the following two stages. In the first stage, the investors determine a fee schedule
Ft(Πt+1, θt, Xt), which is contingent on not only Πt+1 but also on (θt, Xt) that will be determined in the
second stage. The manager decides whether to accept the schedule. If he accepts it, the agents proceed
to the second stage and determine (θt, Xt).
13The intuition is simple: since Rt+1, Πt+1, and Yt+1 are perfectly correlated, assigning different
weights on these variables in a fee arrangement would not affect risk sharing. As we shall see, an optimal
fee arrangement has two properties. The first is the optimal risk sharing between the fund investors and
the manager. The second is that the investors, who have full bargaining power, extract maximum surplus.
Regardless of which of the three variables (Rt+1,Πt+1, Yt+1) we allow the fee to depend on, as long as it
satisfies these two properties, it would result in exactly the same form of contract, and consequently all
the other results would be also identical.
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this case equals the proceeds from the fund portfolio that he absconded with, i.e.,
W˜mt+1 = ξ
α
β
Yt+1. (2.6)
Each fund investor’s terminal wealth in this case is the sum of the proceeds from the
remaining fund portfolio and the riskless asset: W˜ ft+1 = (1− ξ)Yt+1 + (1 + r)(W −Xt).14
2.5 Optimization problems
Each generation-t fund investor chooses capital allocation Xt ≥ 0 to the fund and in-
vestment in the riskless asset to maximize the expected utility derived from her terminal
wealth (given that the manager will not abscond), (2.5). When offering Ft(·) to the man-
ager, the fund investors make sure that it maximizes the expected utility of each of them
and that the manager is willing to continue running the fund rather than abscond, that
is, it satisfies the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint:
Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ≥ Et[um(W˜mt+1)]. (2.7)
Since the manager has zero initial wealth, his participation constraint is Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ≥
Et
[
um(0)
]
. In the following, we omit this constraint because it is implied by (2.7).
Each generation-t fund manager determines the fund’s risk exposure θt ∈ (−∞,∞) to
maximize the expected utility from his terminal wealth (given that he will not abscond),
(2.4). He also decides whether to continue running the fund or abscond, though the fee
schedule in equilibrium ensures that he will choose to continue.
Each generation-t direct investor purchases Kt ∈ (−∞,∞) shares of the stock and
invests the rest of her endowment, (W − PtKt) dollars, in the riskless asset to maximize
the expected utility from her terminal wealth, W dt+1 = Rt+1Kt + (1 + r)W, which is the
sum of the proceeds from the stock and those from the riskless asset.
2.6 Definition of equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of stock price Pt, fund’s fee schedule Ft(·), fund’s risk exposure
θt, fund investor’s capital allocation Xt, and direct investor’s stock holding Kt such that
14It is not important that the investor can collect (1− ξ)Yt+1 from the fund if the manager absconds.
For example, we would obtain exactly the same results even if we assume that no fund assets are left for
the investor if the manager absconds (i.e., W˜ ft+1 = (1 + r)(W −Xt)). The reason is that what matters
for the contracting problem is only the manager’s outside option of absconding, (2.6).
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the following statements hold for all t.
1. Given Pt and θt, Xt and Ft(·) maximize each fund investor’s expected utility.
2. Given Pt, Ft(·), and Xt, θt maximizes each fund manager’s expected utility.
3. Given Pt, Kt maximizes each direct investor’s expected utility.
4. The stock market clears.
3 Benchmark: Equilibrium without Delegation
Before analyzing the equilibrium with portfolio delegation, let us characterize a benchmark
case without delegation, in which fund investors access the stock on their own and fund
managers play no roles. This benchmark case is identical to Spiegel (1998) except that
there are two types of investors (fund investors and direct investors) who have different
degrees of risk aversion. We look for a linear equilibrium in which Pt is linear in δˆ and St.
3.1 Price conjecture
We conjecture and later verify that there exists a constant η > 0 such that, for all t, the
equilibrium stock price is
Pt =
δˆ − ηSt
r
. (3.1)
Conjecture (3.1) states that the price is the present value of expected future dividends
minus a risk premium that is proportional to St, discounted at the riskless rate. This
conjecture implies that, conditional on t, Rt+1 is normally distributed with mean
Rˆt ≡ Et[Rt+1] = ηSt (3.2)
and variance σ2R ≡ Vart[Rt+1] = σ2 + η2σ2s/r2, which is the sum of dividend volatility and
price volatility. Note that (3.1) and (3.2) imply Pt = (δˆ − Rˆt)/r.
3.2 Optimization
Let Kft and K
d
t denote the numbers of shares of the stock held by each fund investor
and direct investor, respectively. Their optimal stock holdings given Rˆt have usual mean-
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variance forms: for i ∈ {f, d},15
Ki(Rˆt) =
Rˆt
γiσ2R
. (3.3)
3.3 Equilibrium
Plugging (3.3) into the stock’s market clearing condition, αKf (Rˆt) + (1−α)Kd(Rˆt) = St,
we obtain the equilibrium expected excess stock return:
Rˆt = Λ(η)St, where Λ(η) ≡ σ
2
R
α
γf
+ 1−α
γd
. (3.4)
Reflecting the risk premium, Rˆt increases with σ
2
R and decreases with the total risk toler-
ance of the economy, measured by α
γf
+ 1−α
γd
(which is the sum of the total risk tolerance of
fund managers α
γf
and that of direct investors 1−α
γd
). Note that Λ is a function of η since
σ2R ≡ σ2 + η2σ2s/r2 depends on η. Recall that we have another expression for Rˆt in (3.2),
which is implied by conjecture (3.1). Thus, conjecture (3.1) is correct if and only if (3.2)
and (3.4) are consistent with each other. This requires
η = Λ(η). (3.5)
That is, the equilibrium values of η are determined at the fixed points of Λ(·). Since σ2R
is quadratic in η, Λ is an increasing quadratic function of η. Moreover, we have Λ(0) > 0.
So, if σs is positive and small enough, (3.5) has two positive roots of η:
η =
r2
2σ2s
( α
γf
+
1− α
γd
)
±
√(
α
γf
+
1− α
γd
)2
− 4σ
2σ2s
r2
 . (3.6)
It is well known that there are potentially multiple equilibria in overlapping generations
models with infinite time horizon and random stock supply (Spiegel 1998; Watanabe
2008; Banerjee 2011).16 Which of these two equilibria should one focus on? As noted by
15The derivation is straightforward. The mean and variance of each investor’s terminal wealth are, for
∈ {f, d}, Et
[
W it+1
]
= RˆtK
i
t +(1+r)W and Vart
[
W it+1
]
= Ki2t σ
2
R. Due to exponential utility, maximizing
Et
[
ui(W it+1)
]
amounts to maximizing Et
[
W it+1
] − γi2 Vart[W it+1] = RˆtKit + (1 + r)W − γi2 Ki2t σ2R. The
first-order condition for Kit is Rˆt − γiσ2RKit = 0, which yields (3.3).
16Each of the two values of η corresponds to a possible self-fulfilling belief of the agents. If they believe
that η is large and thus the price volatility Vart[Pt+1] = η
2σ2s/r
2 is high, each of them tries to balance her
risk bearing by submitting a demand schedule with low price elasticity. The resulting aggregate demand
with low price elasticity is indeed settled by a market-clearing price with a large Vart[Pt+1] (i.e., large η).
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Banerjee (2011), “[t]he choice of which type of equilibrium to study is somewhat arbitrary,
as both types have desirable theoretical and empirical properties.” In the following, we
focus on the smaller root of η because only the equilibrium with the smaller η is stable in
the sense of the following definition, akin to that of Cespa and Vives (2015).
Definition 1. An equilibrium is stable (unstable) if its corresponding value of η is a stable
(unstable) fixed point of Λ(·), that is, if η satisfies |Λ′(η)| < 1 (> 1).
Intuitively, a stable equilibrium is such that after a small perturbation to the agents’ belief
about the value of η, the economy converges back to the original equilibrium through the
best-reply dynamics of the agents’ beliefs and the market-clearing prices.17
The following proposition summarizes the stable equilibrium outcome. For notational
clarity, we append an asterisk to the equilibrium values of the no-delegation case.
Proposition 3.1 (No-delegation benchmark). If fund investors could invest in the stock
directly, the excess stock return Rt+1 is, conditional on t, normally distributed with mean
Rˆ∗t = η
∗St and variance σ∗2R = σ
2 + η∗2σ2s/r
2, where η∗ is the smaller value of (3.6); the
stock price is P ∗t = (δˆ − Rˆ∗t )/r.
Note that Rt+1 in Proposition 3.1 is the share return (i.e., the excess return per share
of the stock held) instead of the dollar return (i.e., the excess return per dollar invested).
The next corollary derives the distribution of the dollar return on the stock market, which
will be used in Section 5 where we discuss empirical implications.
Corollary 3.1 (Market return). Let Ωmarkett+1 ≡ Rt+1/Pt be the market return. Conditional
on t, Ωmarkett+1 is normal with mean µ
market∗
t = Rˆ
∗
t /P
∗
t and standard deviation σ
market∗
t =
σ∗R/P
∗
t . The Sharpe ratio of Ω
market
t+1 is SR
market∗
t = µ
market∗
t /σ
market∗
t = (η
∗/σ∗R)St.
4 Equilibrium with Delegation
This section characterizes the equilibrium with portfolio delegation. As in Section 3, we
look for a linear stable equilibrium. We follow the following steps to solve the model.
17Moreover, the smaller-η equilibrium is more general in the sense that it is well-defined when the
stock supply is constant (i.e., when σ2s = 0), whereas the larger-η equilibrium is not. As noted by Spiegel
(1998), in the larger-η equilibrium, we have η →∞ (and thus Vart[Pt+1]→∞) when σ2s → 0; if σ2s = 0,
then η explodes and the equilibrium is not defined. Also, as shown by Albagli (2015), the smaller-η
equilibrium is more robust in that it can be supported even when the agents’ time horizon is (infinitely)
long, whereas the larger-η equilibrium vanishes when the horizon is long enough.
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1. We conjecture that the equilibrium stock price Pt is of the form (3.1), and thus Rˆt
is given by (3.2), but the value of η is different from (3.6).
2. For arbitrary investment profile (θt, Xt) and Rˆt, we obtain fee schedule Ft(·) in the
contracting problem (Section 4.1).
3. Using Ft(·) of step 2, we derive each fund investor’s best-response function X(θt; Rˆt),
i.e., her optimal choice of Xt for arbitrary θt and Rˆt (Section 4.2).
4. Using Ft(·) of step 2, we derive each manager’s best-response function θ(Xt; Rˆt),
i.e., his optimal choice of θt for arbitrary Xt and Rˆt (Section 4.3).
5. From the two best-response functions obtained in steps 3 and 4, we identify each
fund’s Nash-equilibrium investment profile given Rˆt, (θ(Rˆt), X(Rˆt)) (Section 4.4).
6. Using (θ(Rˆt), X(Rˆt)) of step 5, we compute the aggregate demand for the stock,
impose market clearing, and pin down the equilibrium level of Rˆt. We then verify
that the resulting Pt is indeed in the linear form conjectured in step 1 (Section 4.5).
4.1 Fee contract
Due to the CARA-normal specification, each fund’s optimal fee has a tractable affine form
presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Fee contract). Each fund’s fee is Ft(Πt+1) = φΠt+1 +Qt, where
φ ≡ βγ
f
αγm + βγf
(4.1)
and
Qt ≡ (ξ − φ) Et [Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(
ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Πt+1] . (4.2)
Lemma 4.1 is akin to the risk-sharing result of Wilson (1968). The optimal fee is the
sum of proportional fee φΠt+1 and fixed fee Qt, both functions of (θt, Xt). The optimal risk
sharing, which maximizes the agents’ joint surplus by adjusting the risk-return profiles
of their terminal wealths, requires that the agent with relatively high risk tolerance has
large exposure to the stock. Indeed, the manager’s exposure measured by φ is decreasing
in γm, while each fund investor’s exposure, 1−φ = αγm/(αγm +βγf ), decreases with γf .
Moreover, if the mass α/β of investors in the fund increases, φ decreases to counterbalance
13
the manager’s exposure to the risky fund profit, (α/β)Πt+1. The fund investors set Qt so
that (2.7) binds, since otherwise they could decrease Qt to extract more surplus.
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4.2 Fund investor’s optimization: Capital allocation
This section characterizes each fund investor’s optimal policy for her choice of capital
allocation Xt. We make the following parametric assumption.
Assumption 1: φ > ξ2.
Assumption 1 ensures the investor’s optimal choice of Xt to be finite by excluding an
implausible situation that she increases Xt indefinitely to decrease the payment of fixed
fee Qt.
19 Then her optimal policy is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Fund investor’s best response). Suppose the fee schedule Ft(·) is as in
Lemma 4.1. Given expected stock return Rˆt, each fund investor’s best response to the
manager’s choice of risk exposure θt is allocating
X(θt; Rˆt) = max
{
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt − ξ(1 + r)
γmα
β
(φ− ξ2)σ2Rθ2t
, 0
}
(4.3)
dollars of capital to the fund.
To see the intuition for Lemma 4.2, recall that Ft(·) in Lemma 4.1 is such that the
18One may wonder that if ξ is very small then the fund investors might be better off by letting the
manager abscond and thus not paying fees to him. Such an action is not optimal. First, if the fund
investors pay the fee to the manager, the certainty equivalent of each investor’s terminal wealth is Uft ≡
Et[W
f
t+1]− γ
f
2 Vart[W
f
t+1] = (1−ξ)RˆtθtXt−ξ(1+r)Xt+(1+r)W− γ
m
2
α
β (φ−ξ2)θ2tX2t σ2R. Second, if the fund
investors let the manager abscond, the certainty equivalent would be U˜ft ≡ Et[W˜ ft+1] − γ
f
2 Vart[W˜
f
t+1] =
(1 − ξ)RˆtθtXt − ξ(1 + r)Xt + (1 + r)W − γ
f
2 (1 − ξ)2θ2tX2t σ2R. So, Uft R U˜ft ⇐⇒ (ξ − φ)2 R 0, which
means that Uft > U˜
f
t for any parameter values. The reason is that risk sharing in the second case is
suboptimal, as the manager and each investor split Πt+1 in the proportion of ξ and 1− ξ, rather than φ
and 1− φ. If ξ is very small, the investor’s risk bearing in the second case is too high: she could achieve
a better return-risk profile by reducing her risk exposure from (1− ξ)Πt+1 to (1− φ)Πt+1.
19If Assumption 1 is violated, it would be optimal for each fund investor to choose Xt = ∞ for the
following reason. An increase in Xt increases Vart[Πt+1], which has two opposing effects on the fund
investor’s expected utility. On the one hand, it has a negative effect because she is risk averse. But
on the other hand, it has a positive effect because it decreases her payment of Qt (which is because
a rise in Vart[Πt+1] increases the volatility of the manager’s outside option of absconding, thereby he
requires smaller Qt to not abscond). If the mass of investors in each fund, α/β, is very large, the second
effect dominates the first one, and it would be optimal for the investor to choose an extremely large Xt
to increase Vart[Πt+1] as much as possible. Assumption 1 eliminates such an implausible behavior by
ensuring that the first effect prevails.
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manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (2.7) binds; that is, the manager effectively
faces terminal wealth (2.6) that he would obtain if he absconds. With this remark, (4.3)
can be viewed as a CARA-normal mean-variance solution. It states that the investor’s
choice of Xt is increasing in the expected effective after-fee fund return (the numerator),
and is decreasing in the volatility of that return (the denominator).
Note that X(θt; Rˆt) is inverse U-shaped in θt: for small θt it increases with θt, but
for large θt it decreases with θt (illustrated in Figure 2 below). It makes intuitive sense
that X(θt; Rˆt) is decreasing in θt for large θt. That is, the investor optimally adjusts Xt
to the opposite direction of θt to balance her exposure to the stock. Then, why does she
increase Xt in response to a rise in θt if θt is small? The key to this is the term ξ(1 + r)
in the numerator of (4.3), which represents the rent that the fund investor leaves to the
manager to deter him from absconding. To see this, recall that the manager can abscond
with a fraction ξ of the fund’s entire asset. So when delegating Xt dollars of capital to
the manager, the investor effectively grants a fraction ξ of that capital—i.e., ξ(1 + r)Xt
dollars in period-(t+ 1) value—as a rent to the manager to prevent him from absconding.
The term ξ(1 + r) in the numerator of (4.3) is the marginal value of the rent.20 Since the
rent does not depend on θt, it effectively serves as a fixed cost of stock investment from
the investor’s perspective. Thus, if the manager increases θt, the rent per share of the
stock held in the fund decreases, making it cheaper for the investor to get exposure to
the stock. This encourages the investor to allocate more capital to the fund, creating the
upward-sloping part of X(θt; Rˆt). If θt is very small, the rent per share of the stock is so
large that the investor does not allocate any capital to the fund (i.e., X(θt; Rˆt) = 0).
4.3 Fund manager’s optimization: Fund’s risk exposure
This section determines the manager’s optimal policy for his choice of fund’s risk exposure
θt. There are two routes through which θt affects his expected utility. First, it affects
his personal exposure to the stock via the proportional fee φΠt+1, because Πt+1 depends
on θt. Second, it affects fixed fee Qt through Et[Πt+1] and Vart[Πt+1], which are both
increasing in θt. The manager takes these effects into account when choosing θt.
20The following argument, though not entirely rigorous, helps us grasp the economic intuition behind
the numerator of (4.3). From (2.5), each fund investor’s terminal wealth is W ft+1 = Yt+1 − Ft+1 + (1 +
r)(W −Xt) = Πt+1−Ft+1 +(1+r)W . Since the manager can abscond with ξYt+1, the investor effectively
leaves ξYt+1 to the manager to deter him from absconding. Thus, if we replace Ft+1 with ξYt+1, we have
W ft+1 = Πt+1 − ξYt+1 + (1 + r)W = (1 − ξ)Πt+1 − ξ(1 + r)Xt + (1 + r)W . So the marginal expected
wealth is ∂Et[W
f
t+1]/∂Xt = (1− ξ)Rˆtθt − ξ(1 + r), which is identical to the numerator of (4.3).
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Lemma 4.3 (Fund manager’s best response). Suppose the fee schedule Ft(·) is as in
Lemma 4.1. Given expected stock return Rˆt, the manager’s best response to the investor’s
choice of capital allocation Xt > 0 is to choose the fund’s risk exposure
θ(Xt; Rˆt) =
βRˆt
γmαξσ2RXt
. (4.4)
The manager’s best response (4.4) can be viewed as a CARA-normal mean-variance
solution, as if he is facing the terminal wealth (2.6) that he would obtain if absconding.
Not surprisingly, his choice of θt is increasing in Rˆt and decreasing in σ
2
R and γ
m. The
mass of investors in his fund, α/β, affects θt negatively for the following reason. A rise in
α/β increases the “total proportional fee rate” αγf/(αγm + βγf ), i.e., φ for each investor
multiplied by the mass α/β of investors. This increases the manager’s personal exposure
to the stock, which he tries to counterbalance by reducing θt. Note that choosing θt given
Xt is equivalent to choosing θtXt, the number of shares of the stock held for each investor.
Hence, the manager optimally decreases θt in response to an increase in Xt to balance his
personal exposure to the stock.
4.4 Fund’s investment profile
To determine the funds’ demand for the stock, let us identify each fund’s optimal in-
vestment profile, i.e., Nash-equilibrium pair (θ(Rˆt), X(Rˆt)) for given Rˆt. This pair is
determined by solving the two best response functions, (4.3) and (4.4), for θt and Xt. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the nonmonotonicity of X(θt; Rˆt) is critical to the existence of a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The key to this nonmonotonicity is the rent that each
fund investor leaves to the manager, as discussed already in Lemma 4.2.
To ensure that the two best response functions cross, we assume the following.
Assumption 2: φ < ξ.
Assumption 2 requires that the mass α/β of fund investors in each fund is not too small.21
If α/β increases, θ(Xt; Rˆt) shifts downward because the manager tries to rebalance his
personal risk exposure in response to the increased fund size, but X(θt; Rˆt) shifts upward
because the associated lower Qt leads the investor to increase Xt.
22 Thus, the two best
21Assumptions 1 and 2 are compatible with each other. For example, the parameter values used in
Figure 2 (α = 0.4, β = 0.001, γf = 1, γm = 1, and ξ = 0.01) satisfy both of them.
22Qt decreases with α/β for the following reason. A higher α/β makes W˜
m
t+1 more volatile. With this
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Figure 2: Determination of the fund’s Nash-equilibrium investment profile given Rˆt. The
parameter values used in the figure are r = 0.01, γf = 1, γm = 1, ξ = 0.01, α = 0.4, β =
0.001, and σ2R = 1. We set Rˆt = 1.4286, which is the equilibrium level of Rˆt determined
later with St = 1.
response functions cross if α/β is large enough. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (4.3) and
(4.4) pin down each fund’s investment profile given Rˆt as follows.
Lemma 4.4 (Fund’s investment profile). Given expected stock return Rˆt, there is a unique
pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium investment profile (θ(Rˆt), X(Rˆt)) for each fund, where
θ(Rˆt) =
(
(1 + r)ξ2
ξ − φ
)
1
Rˆt
(4.5)
and
X(Rˆt) =
(
β(ξ − φ)
(1 + r)γmαξ3σ2R
)
Rˆ2t . (4.6)
Overall, Lemma 4.4 is in line with Hugonnier and Kaniel (2010), who find (1) a positive
relation between a fund’s proportional fee rate and its leverage and (2) a negative relation
between the fee rate and the investor’s holding of the fund. Moreover, Lemma 4.4 implies
that the fund’s stock holding for each investor, θ(Rˆt)X(Rˆt), is independent of φ (given
Rˆt) because the positive effect of φ on θ(·) and its negative effect on X(·) just offset each
less attractive outside option, the manager is willing to continue running the fund for a lower Qt.
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other. This feature is also consistent with the result of Hugonnier and Kaniel (2010) that
the investor’s effective portfolio weights are independent of the fee rate.
4.5 Equilibrium
Each direct investor’s optimal policy K(Rˆt) is the same as in the benchmark case, (3.3).
Using (3.3), (4.5), and (4.6), the period-t aggregate demand for the stock is
αθ(Rˆt)X(Rˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
funds’ demand
+ (1− α)K(Rˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct investors’ demand
=
(
β
ξγm
+
1− α
γd
)
Rˆt
σ2R
. (4.7)
The aggregate demand (4.7) is a decreasing affine function of Pt because Rˆt is a decreasing
affine function of Pt. Equating (4.7) to the aggregate supply St determines the equilibrium
expected excess stock return:
Rˆt = Λ(η)St, where Λ(η) ≡ σ
2
R
β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
. (4.8)
Unlike its counterpart in the no-delegation case, (3.4), Rˆt in (4.8) decreases with the
effective total risk tolerance of fund managers, represented by β
ξγm
, but does not reflect
the fund investors’ total risk tolerance α
γf
because the managers effectively “undo” these
investors’ impact on the price by adjusting θt given Xt.
The consistency between (3.2) and (4.8) requires that η solves the quadratic equation
η = Λ(η) that has two positive roots:
η =
r2
2σ2s
( β
ξγm
+
1− α
γd
)
±
√(
β
ξγm
+
1− α
γd
)2
− 4σ
2σ2s
r2
 , (4.9)
where only the smaller root is relevant for the stable equilibrium.
Viewing Pt and Rˆt as functions of η, their functional forms are identical in the no-
delegation case (Section 3) and the delegation case (Section 4). Thus, we have the follow-
ing proposition on the stock price and return in the stable equilibrium. We append two
asterisks to the equilibrium values of the delegation case.
Proposition 4.1 (Stock market). The stock return and price characterizations are similar
to those without delegation (Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1) with η∗ being replaced by
η∗∗, where η∗∗ is the smaller value of (4.9).
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Proposition 4.1 states that, in terms of the stock price and return, the difference
between the no-delegation case and the delegation case stems directly from the difference
between η∗ and η∗∗. More specifically, the difference is that the total risk tolerance of
fund investors α
γf
in (3.6) is replaced by the effective total risk tolerance of fund managers
β
ξγm
in (4.9). This implies that the presence of fund managers represents a shift in the
aggregate risk bearing capacity. Thus, asset price dynamics with delegation are the same
as they would be in an economy with two agents with different degrees of risk aversion,
for appropriately selected levels of CARA coefficients.23
The next proposition presents the variables related to portfolio delegation in the stable
equilibrium, whose counterparts do not exist in the no-delegation case.
Proposition 4.2 (Portfolio delegation). In the stable equilibrium,
1. each fund’s fee schedule is
Ft(Πt+1) = φΠt+1 +
(
β(ξ − φ)(ξ − φ+ 2)σ∗∗2R
2αξ2γm
(
β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t , (4.10)
where Πt+1 ≡ Rt+1θtXt, φ ≡ βγf/(αγm + βγf ), and σ∗∗2R = σ2 + η∗∗2σ2s/r2;
2. each fund’s size (i.e., assets under management) is
α
β
X∗∗t =
(
(ξ − φ)σ∗∗2R
γm(1 + r)ξ3
(
β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t ; (4.11)
3. each fund buys (α/β)θ∗∗t X
∗∗
t shares of the stock, where
θ∗∗t =
(
(1 + r)ξ2
(
β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)
(ξ − φ)σ∗∗2R
)
1
St
. (4.12)
The equilibrium with delegation involves a feedback loop among stock price, fund’s
investment profile, and fee schedule. In each fund, the agents take into account the fee
schedule when choosing the capital allocation and the fund’s risk exposure, while the fee
schedule depends on these agents’ choices, and the stock price adjusts so that the agents’
choices are consistent with market clearing. Since St is stochastic, Pt is stochastically
time varying. Accordingly, the agents’ optimal choices of Ft(·), Xt, θt, and Kt are also
23I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these interpretations of Proposition 4.1.
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time varying with St.
24 Detailed analysis of this equilibrium is deferred to Section 5, in
which we discuss the model’s empirical implications.
It is worth noting that it would be optimal for each fund investor to allocate capital to
only one fund even if she was allowed to access multiple funds. That is, the equilibrium
of this section is also an equilibrium for the case in which investors can allocate capital to
multiple funds. The reason is simple: since there is no diversification benefit from investing
in multiple funds and yet the fee schedule (4.10) involves a fixed fee, it is optimal for each
investor to access only one fund to avoid duplication of fixed fees.
Note that St (and therefore Rˆt) can go negative because t is normally distributed
(for example, noise traders may place a very large buy order). The model’s solution
makes intuitive sense even in such a situation. The fund size (4.11) is proportional to S2t ,
meaning that fund investors provide a positive amount of capital irrespective of whether St
is positive or negative. This is because fund managers guarantee positive expected returns
on the investor capital by buying the stock in “normal times” (i.e., θ∗∗t > 0 when St > 0)
and shorting it in the reverse condition (i.e., θ∗∗t < 0 when St < 0). The next corollary
makes this point clearer. It derives the distribution of the dollar return on each fund,
which we refer to as the fund return, and shows that the expected fund return is positive
regardless of St. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the distributions of
both market return and fund return explicitly in an asset-pricing model.
Corollary 4.1 (Fund return). Let Ωfundt+1 ≡ (Πt+1−Ft(Πt+1))/Xt be the fund return, i.e.,
the after-fee excess rate of return on each fund. Conditional on t,
1. Ωfundt+1 is normal with mean
µfund∗∗ =
(1 + r)ξ
(
φ− ξ2+φ2
2
)
ξ − φ (4.13)
and standard deviation
σfund∗∗t =
(
(1 + r)ξ2(1− φ)( β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)
(ξ − φ)σ∗∗R
)
1
|St| ; (4.14)
24The funds’ aggregate stock holding, αθ∗∗t X
∗∗
t =
(
β
ξγm /
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
))
St, and the direct investors’
aggregate stock holding, (1− α)K∗∗t =
((
1−α
γd
)
/
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
))
St, are also time varying with St.
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2. the Sharpe ratio of Ωfundt+1 is
SRfund∗∗t ≡
µfund∗∗
σfund∗∗t
=
( (
φ− ξ2+φ2
2
)
σ∗∗R
ξ(1− φ)( β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)) |St|. (4.15)
It is readily checked from (4.15) and Assumption 2 that the funds are not able to
beat the market in normal times with St > 0, that is, SR
fund∗∗
t < SR
market∗∗
t if St > 0.
This result is not surprising: as long as St > 0 and therefore Rˆt = ηSt > 0, no fund
investor should achieve a better risk-adjusted return than she would do when holding the
market, because the managers access the same market and yet the investors pay fees to
these managers. When St < 0 and thus Rˆt < 0, holding the market directly is obviously
unprofitable because SRmarkett < 0. However, even in such times, investing in a fund
is profitable for fund investors because the manager shorts the market (i.e., θt < 0) to
generate a positive expected return on the investor capital (i.e., SRfundt > 0).
5 Empirical Implications
This section discusses empirical implications drawn from the equilibrium outcome pre-
sented in Section 4. Unless otherwise noted, we focus on the case of St > 0.
5.1 Effects of portfolio delegation on stock prices
First, we study the impact of portfolio delegation on the stock’s expected returns and price
volatility. Viewing µmarkett , SR
market
t , and Vart[Pt+1] as functions of η, their functional
forms are identical in the no-delegation case (Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.1) and the
delegation case (Proposition 4.1); moreover, all of them are monotonically increasing in
η. Thus, the equilibrium levels of these three variables in the delegation case are larger
(smaller) than those in the no-delegation case if and only if η∗∗ > (<)η∗.
5.1.1 Expected returns
According to Investment Company Institute (2014), in the U.S., the number of house-
holds owning mutual funds has more than doubled in the last two decades, going from 27
million in 1993 to 56.7 million in 2013 (Figure 3, solid line). “As households have come
to rely more on funds over the past decade, their demand for directly held equities has
fallen” (Investment Company Institute 2014). These facts imply that α has increased
21
4400
4900
5400
5900
6400
6900
7400
7900
8400
23
28
33
38
43
48
53
58
1 9
9 3
1 9
9 4
1 9
9 5
1 9
9 6
1 9
9 7
1 9
9 8
1 9
9 9
2 0
0 0
2 0
0 1
2 0
0 2
2 0
0 3
2 0
0 4
2 0
0 5
2 0
0 6
2 0
0 7
2 0
0 8
2 0
0 9
2 0
1 0
2 0
1 1
2 0
1 2
2 0
1 3
Number of the US households owning 
mutual funds (left axis, millions)
Number of funds of the US 
mutual fund industry (right axis)
Figure 3: Number of the U.S. households owning mutual funds (solid line; left axis in
millions) and the number of funds in the U.S. mutual fund industry (dashed line; right
axis). Source: Investment Company Institute (2014).
dramatically in the past two decades. Meanwhile, the number of mutual funds has in-
creased too. Investment Company Institute (2014) reports that there are 7,707 mutual
funds in the U.S. in 2013, while there were 4,534 in 1993 (Figure 3, dashed line). This
observation indicates that β has increased significantly. Despite these dramatic shifts in
the portfolio management industry, however, on the surface there is no clear trend in the
overall stock market return over the past two decades (see Figure 4(b) below for S&P 500
returns). The following result reconciles these three observations: (1) a rise in α, (2) a
rise in β, and (3) no trend in the stock market return.
Result 1. The expected market returns, both non risk-adjusted (µmarket∗∗t ) and risk-
adjusted (SRmarket∗∗t ), are
1. positively related to the proportion α of fund investors and negatively related to the
mass β of fund managers, and
2. larger or smaller than those of the no-delegation case, depending on the parameter
values: µmarket∗∗t > µ
market∗
t and SR
market∗∗
t > SR
market∗
t if
α
β
> 1
ξ
γf
γm
, but µmarket∗∗t <
µmarket∗t and SR
market∗∗
t < SR
market∗
t if
α
β
< 1
ξ
γf
γm
.
Statement 1 implies that both α and β do impact the stock market returns, but
those impacts may have offset each other (that is, a rise in α increased the expected
market returns but a rise in β lowered them) and therefore have not appeared clearly on
the observed stock returns. The proof of statement 1 is straightforward by algebra, as
dη∗∗/dα > 0 and dη∗∗/dβ < 0 in the stable equilibrium. Statement 2 indicates that the
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stock’s expected returns under delegation may exceed those of the no-delegation case if α
is large and β is small enough, i.e., if a large mass of investors allocate capital to a small
mass of fund managers.25 Note that Result 1 does not rely on the assumption that St is
time-varying, as it follows from comparative statics of α and β.
Why is the expected stock return high if α/β is large? To see the intuition, it is useful
to consider the following decomposition of the expected stock return, Rˆ∗∗t St. It is the
sum of four components: (1) the total risk premium demanded by fund managers, (2) the
total risk premium demanded by fund investors, (3) the total risk premium demanded by
direct investors, and (4) the total rents paid by fund investors.26 That is,
Rˆ∗∗t St = βγ
mVart
[
Wmt+1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
managers’ total risk premium
+ αγfVart
[
W ft+1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
fund investors’ total risk premium
+ (1− α)γdVart
[
W dt+1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct investors’ total risk premium
+ αξ(1 + r)X∗∗t .︸ ︷︷ ︸
rents paid by fund investors
(5.1)
The total proportional fee rate ultimately relevant for each manager’s risk bearing is
(α/β)φ = αγf/(αγm+βγf ), which increases with α and decreases with β. Thus, a rise in
α and/or a decrease in β induces him to demand a larger risk premium, increasing the first
term on the RHS of (5.1). Each fund investor receives a fraction 1−φ = αγm/(αγm+βγf )
of Πt+1, which also increases with α and decreases with β. Hence, a rise in α and/or a
decrease in β also leads to a higher risk premium demanded by fund investors, increasing
the second term of (5.1). Furthermore, a rise in α increases the total rents too: a higher
α means that more investors demand extra premia on stock returns to compensate such
rents, and thus the fourth term of (5.1) increases.27 These effects collectively surpass the
decrease in the third term of (5.1) caused by a rise in α, and hence the net effect of α on
the expected stock return is positive.
Both µmarket∗∗t and SR
market∗∗
t increase with agency friction ξ, as dη
∗∗/dξ > 0 in the
stable equilibrium. Moreover, statement 2 of Result 1 states that these returns surpass the
25Both αβ >
1
ξ
γf
γm and
α
β <
1
ξ
γf
γm can be compatible with Assumptions 1 and 2. For example, suppose
α = 0.6, β = 0.2, and γf = γm = 1. Then, ξ = 0.4 leads to αβ >
1
ξ
γf
γm whereas ξ = 0.3 leads to
α
β <
1
ξ
γf
γm ,
while both of them satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2.
26Each agent’s risk premium is defined as her/his risk aversion γi multiplied by the conditional variance
of her/his terminal wealth. Multiplying it by the mass of agents yields the total risk premium.
27Although the rent ξ(1 + r)X∗∗t is transferred to the manager (through Qt), it does not affect his
choice of θt because it is independent of θt. Thus, the rent has no impact on the stock price through
the managers’ actions. This is the reason the rent is not offset in (5.1) in the form of a reduction in the
premium demanded by the managers.
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no-delegation levels if ξ is large. These results contrast with Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley
(2014), who find that the aggregate market’s expected return decreases with the agency
friction. Their result arises from asymmetric cross-sectional price distortions in multiple
stocks. In contrast, our result holds for a single stock, and the intuition is derived from
(5.1). As ξ increases, each fund investor needs to leave a larger rent ξ(1 + r)X∗∗t to the
manager. To compensate it, she demands a higher expected return on the stock market,
driving up Rˆ∗∗t by increasing the fourth term on the RHS of (5.1).
Result 1 is in line with He and Krishnamurthy (2012), who show that the financial
specialist’s presence in the economy inversely impacts the market risk premium and Sharpe
ratio. However, the economic mechanisms are different. In He and Krishnamurthy (2012),
the key is the specialist’s equity capital constraint: if his wealth decreases when the
constraint is binding (i.e., in the “crisis” situation), the risk premium rises to reflect the
capital scarcity. By contrast, our Result 1 holds in non-crisis times, and the key to the
result is the risk sharing between fund investors and managers through the fee contract.
Our result that dSRmarket∗∗t /dβ < 0 is also consistent with Basak and Pavlova (2012)
who find that the Sharpe ratio decreases with the fraction of institutional investors in
the economy. In their model, a large demand pressure from institutional investors—who
care about their performance relative to an index—requires that, for the stock market to
clear, the market becomes less attractive with a lower Sharpe ratio.
5.1.2 Price volatility
Ever since Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) found that “stock prices move too
much to be justified by changes in subsequent dividends,” the so-called excess volatility
puzzle has been of interest among financial economists. Our model implies that some of
the characteristics of portfolio delegation affect stock price volatility positively.
Result 2. Stock price volatility Vart[P
∗∗
t+1] = η
∗∗2σ2s/r
2 is
1. positively related to the proportion α of fund investors and negatively related to the
mass β of fund managers, and
2. larger or smaller than that of the no-delegation case, depending on the parameter
values: Vart[P
∗∗
t+1] > Vart[P
∗
t+1] if
α
β
> 1
ξ
γf
γm
, but Vart[P
∗∗
t+1] < Vart[P
∗
t+1] if
α
β
< 1
ξ
γf
γm
.
That is, stock price tends to be highly volatile when a large fraction of investors access
the market indirectly through a small number of financial experts. The result stems from
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the “risk concentration effect.” As a large amount of investor capital is concentrated in
a small mass of fund managers, the fee arrangement (4.10) requires that each manager
bears a large market risk ceteris paribus. Thus, to balance his personal risk bearing by
reducing the variation of stock holding, the manager submits a demand schedule with low
price elasticity. In equilibrium, the aggregate demand with low price elasticity is settled
by a highly volatile market-clearing price. To see this graphically, consider the classical
demand-supply diagram with price on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal
axis. If α is high and/or β is low, the slope of the stock’s demand curve is steep because
the coefficient of Pt in (4.7)—which equals 1/η in equilibrium—is small. This makes the
market-clearing price volatile for a given fluctuation of the vertical supply curve St.
Result 2 shares the key insight of Basak and Pavlova (2012) that “institutional in-
vestors make the stock more volatile.” Their economic mechanism for the large volatility
is different from ours. They argue that a large demand pressure from institutional in-
vestors makes the market less attractive (i.e., more volatile) since otherwise the stock
market would not clear. Result 2 is also consistent with Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), who
show that stock volatility is higher in the economy with a proportional performance fee
than in the benchmark case with costless delegation.
The signs of comparative statics of the market return volatility σmarkett are the same
as those of statement 1 of Result 2. But, in the real world, has the market return
volatility changed behind the change in the fund management industry? The data say no:
Campbell et al. (2001) report that the aggregate market volatility did not change during
the 1962-1997 period, in which there was a dramatic shift towards institutional ownership
of stocks.28 A possible explanation that reconciles this empirical fact and Result 2 is that,
as discussed in Section 5.1.1, α has increased while β has also increased over time and
thus offset each other’s effects on the market return volatility.
5.2 Comovement: Portfolio delegation and stock market
This section studies the dynamics of delegation-related variables such as fees, fund flows,
and fund strategies, which are not analyzed in the no-delegation benchmark case. Our
goal is to understand how and why these variables comove with the stock market.
Recall that St is the only source of time variation of the endogenous variables presented
in Proposition 4.2 (except for Πt+1, which varies also with δt+1). Thus, unlike Result 1,
28Although the aggregate market volatility did not change, Campbell et al. (2001) find a positive
trend in the idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms. Bennett et al. (2003) and Xu and Malkiel (2003)
argue that this increase in the idiosyncratic volatility is due to a rise in institutional ownership.
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the results presented in this section are driven by the assumption that St is time-varying.
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5.2.1 Fund fees and stock market return
Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 shed light on the role of fund fees as a risk-sharing mechanism
that connects the extent of portfolio delegation and stock market performance. Then,
what is the relation between fund fees per se and the stock market return?
Result 3. Conditional on t, fund’s expense ratio Ft(Πt+1)/Xt is normal with mean
Et
[
Ft(Πt+1)
Xt
]
= (1 + r)ξ
(
ξ2 + φ2
2(ξ − φ) + 1
)
, (5.2)
which is independent of the market return, and standard deviation
SDt
[
Ft(Πt+1)
Xt
]
=
(
(1 + r)ξ2φ
(
β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
)
(ξ − φ)σ∗R
)
1
|St| . (5.3)
That is, regardless of Ωmarkett that is time varying with St, funds adopt a fixed expected
expense ratio every period. Moreover, the ratio’s standard deviation (5.3) is much smaller
than σmarkett if |St| is large. So the model predicts that the time variation of the realized
expense ratio can be much smaller than that of the stock market return and other variables
such as fund flows. This is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 4. It plots simulated paths
of Ωmarkett+1 = Rt+1/Pt (solid line), Ft(Πt+1)/Xt (dashed line), and the aggregate fund
flow ∆(αXt) (dash-dotted line), with their values for t = 0 being normalized to 1. The
simulation appears to be in line with the real-world mutual fund industry and stock
market. As shown in panel (b) of Figure 4, the average expense ratio in the U.S. mutual
fund industry is quite stable compared to the stock market return and the aggregate fund
flow (per fund) that exhibit large volatility on a similar scale as our model’s simulation.30,31
29All these results do not rely on the assumption that St is a random walk. As discussed in Appendix
G.2, they would also go through under other assumptions that St is non-persistent or mean-reverting.
Here, a caveat is that our attention is limited to AR(1) processes of St. We have not been able to check
whether our results are robust to non-AR(1) specifications of St because we have not yet solved for
equilibria under such processes. For example, if we assume St to be AR(q) with q ≥ 2, the equilibrium
price function would be different from (3.1) because Et[St+1] would depend not only on St but also on
St+1−q; but we have not identified the function yet. We leave this issue for future research.
30While the expense ratio looks constant in Figure 4, it actually stochastically evolves over time in a
small scale, between 0.01043 and 0.01048 in panel (a), and between 0.0078 and 0.0096 in panel (b).
31Equation (5.2) implies that Et[Ft(Πt+1)/Xt] is a decreasing function of α/β. Thus, although α and
β have changed significantly over the last few decades, since the ratio α/β has been fairly stable (Figure
3), the model’s prediction that the expected expense ratio is constant is consistent with the data.
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(a) Simulation. The panel shows the time variation of our model’s market return Ωmarkett+1 =
Rt+1/Pt (solid line), expense ratio Ft(Πt+1)/Xt, (dashed line), and aggregate fund flow ∆(αXt)
(dash-dotted line). For t = 0, Ωmarkett+1 = 4.35%, Ft(Πt+1)/Xt = 0.01046, and ∆(αXt) = 0.00041,
which are all normalized to 1. The parameter values are r = 0.04, δˆ = 0.1, σ2 = 0.01, σ2s = 0.001,
S0 = 1, γ
f = γm = γd = 1, α = 0.4138, β = 0.000067, and ξ = 0.01. The value of α is the
percentage of U.S. households owing mutual funds (the average of 1993–2013). The value of β is
the number of funds of the U.S. mutual fund industry divided by the number of U.S. households
(the average of 1993–2013). Source: Investment Company Institute (2014).
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(b) Data. The panel shows the time variation of S&P 500 total annual return including dividend
(solid line), the U.S. mutual funds’ average expense ratio (dashed line), and the aggregate fund flow
per fund in the U.S. mutual fund industry (dash-dotted line). For year 1993, the S&P 500 return
is 10.08%, the average expense ratio is 0.0096, and the per-fund aggregate fund flow is $27 million,
which are all normalized to 1. Source: Standard & Poor’s and Investment Company Institute.
Figure 4: Market return, expense ratio, and aggregate fund flow: simulation vs. data.
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The reason the expected expense ratio is independent of the market return is the
following. The level of Ft(Πt+1) is positively related to the expected market return. This
makes sense: since each manager’s outside option is high in good times when Rˆt is high,
the fund investors need to pay a large Qt to let the manager continue running the fund.
Meanwhile, in good times, the investors allocate a large Xt to the fund. Indeed, Figure
4 shows that the fund flow is positively related to the market return, both in simulation
and data.32 So when we look at the ratio Ft(Πt+1)/Xt, the effect of the market return
is just offset between the numerator and the denominator, and it becomes a constant in
expectation.33
5.2.2 Aggregate fund flows and stock market return
The model yields implications for the relation between aggregate fund flows and stock
market returns. Note that studying aggregate fund flows (at macro level) is fundamentally
different from studying fund flows between individual funds (at micro level).34 As Warther
(1995) explains, “[a]t macro level, flows between funds net out, so only aggregate flows
into and out of the entire market remain. Thus, attention at the macro level centers on
large-scale movements of money into and out of the market without regard to which fund
it goes into or comes from.” Warther (1995) finds evidence of: (1) a positive relation
between flows and subsequent returns, and (2) a negative relation between returns and
subsequent flows.35 The model provides theoretical support for both of these findings.
Result 4. Over time,
1. aggregate fund flow ∆(αXt) is positively related to subsequent market return Ω
market
t+1 =
Rt+1/Pt;
2. aggregate fund flow ∆(αXt) is inversely related to past market return Ω
market
t =
Rt/Pt−1.
32Although Ωmarkett+1 and ∆(αXt) are positively related, they are not perfectly correlated. This is
because Ωmarkett+1 evolves with two random variables, St and δt, while ∆(αXt) depends only on St.
33This logic goes through even under alternative measures of the expense ratio such as Ft(Πt+1)/Yt+1
and Ft(Πt+1)/(Yt+1−Ft(Πt+1)). Although we do not obtain simple expressions for the mean and standard
deviation of these measures, the simulation results (which are not presented but available on request)
show that the realized expense ratio is still much less volatile than the market return because the variation
of St is cancelled out between the numerator and the denominator.
34For the micro approach, see, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
35Fant (1999) also finds evidence of a negative relation between returns and subsequent flows.
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Statement 1 holds because both ∆(αXt) and Ω
market
t+1 comove positively with St. When
St increases, Pt falls, so Ω
market
t+1 =
δt+1+Pt+1
Pt
− (1 + r) tends to increase (though it can
decrease if the realization of δt+1 is very low). Because each fund investor chooses Xt
based on the expectation of Ωmarkett+1 , flow ∆(αXt) also increases.
Statement 2 contrasts with the well-documented empirical fact at micro level that
individual fund’s flow-performance relation is positive and convex (Chevalier and Ellison
1997). Statement 2 implies that, at macro level, fund investors are “somewhat contrarian”
(Warther 1995). The result holds because the past market return Ωmarkett decreases with
St (because Ω
market
t =
δt+Pt
Pt−1
− (1 + r) is increasing in Pt that comoves negatively with St),
whereas the current flow ∆(αXt) comoves positively with St. The intuition is as follows.
If St increases, Pt falls. So the investors who bought the stock in period t − 1 sell them
cheap in period t, and thus Ωmarkett decreases. But, because low Pt implies high Ω
market
t+1
(which is relevant for the investor’s choice of Xt), the current flow ∆(αXt) increases.
We have two remarks on the robustness of Result 4. First, both statements 1 and 2
would hold even if St is independent over time or mean reverting (see Appendix G.2). As
seen from the economic intuitions discussed above, the three elements needed for Result
4 are dXt/dSt > 0, dΩ
market
t+1 /dSt > 0, and dΩ
market
t /dSt < 0, none of which relies on
our assumption that St is a random walk. Second, since Warther (1995) studies monthly
return patterns, one may argue that his results may not be compatible with our model
where each generation lives for only two periods. However, we will show in Section 6 that
Result 4 still holds in a model with infinitely-lived agents, in which the length of each
time period can be interpreted more flexibly.
5.2.3 Fund’s trading strategy and stock market return: Volatility timing
The model also has implications for fund managers’ trading strategies, such as volatility
timing documented by Busse (1999). He finds that more than 80% of mutual funds in
his sample decrease their market exposure when market volatility is high. Giambona and
Golec (2009) also find that the majority of funds time volatility counter-cyclically. The
model’s prediction is consistent with their findings.
Result 5. Fund’s volatility timing is counter-cyclical. That is, each fund manager de-
creases the fund’s risk exposure θt when the market return volatility σ
market
t increases.
Result 5 follows from Proposition 4.1 and (4.12). Over time, θt and σ
market
t move in
the opposite directions because θt (resp., σ
market
t ) moves in the opposite (resp., same)
direction of St. The intuition is the following. Suppose that St increases in period t, and
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thus Pt falls. On the one hand, this price fall increases σ
market
t .
36 On the other hand,
the price fall increases Rˆt, encouraging fund investors to increase Xt. In response to this,
each manager optimally decreases θt to rebalance his personal exposure to the stock.
An alternative measure of fund’s risk exposure is the leverage ratio, defined as the
amount of borrowing divided by capital, i.e., Lt ≡ (PtθtXt − Xt)/Xt = Ptθt − 1. For a
similar economic intuition as the one for Result 5, the model predicts that funds tend to
use leverage also counter-cyclically, that is, Lt and σ
market
t comove negatively over time.
5.2.4 Market return vs. fund return
The model allows us to distinguish market return and fund return, identify their distribu-
tions, and offer testable implications on their equilibrium relation. The following result
indicates that these returns may evolve quite differently over time.
Result 6. Comparing the distributions of market return and fund return,
1. the expected market return µmarkett is time-varying (with supply shock St), but the
expected fund return µfund is constant over time;
2. the market return volatility σmarkett and the fund return volatility σ
fund
t comove neg-
atively.
The reason µfund is constant over time (statement 1) is that the managers undo the
impact of St on µ
fund. To see this, consider what happens if St decreases. This increases
Pt, which decreases µ
market
t because one dollar buys a smaller number of shares of the
stock. However, under portfolio delegation, each manager levers up each investor’s one
dollar of capital so that the expected return from investing one dollar in the fund is still
the same as before the rise in Pt. More specifically, even if the stock return Rˆt decreases
due to a decrease in St, the manager increases θt so that the expected rate of return on
the fund (before fee) is Rˆtθt, independent of St.
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Statement 2 of Result 6 implies that funds effectively provide investors with a “volatil-
ity hedge.” The intuition follows from Result 5 that the managers decrease the funds’
36The price fall allows investors to purchase a larger number of shares of the stock by one dollar. Thus,
the return on the market per dollar invested increases in expectation but becomes more volatile too.
37Kaniel and Kondor (2013) argue that funds are less volatile than the market on average, that is,
the average fund overperforms the market in recessions and underperforms in expansions. Although the
economic mechanisms are different, their result and statement 1 of Result 6 share the idea that funds
provide investors with more stable returns than the market over time. This “stabilizing role” of funds is
supported empirically by Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerbuygh, and Veldkamp (2012), who find that after-fee
excess fund returns are negative in expansions and positive in recessions.
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risk exposure when market volatility increases. The volatility hedge is consistent with the
agents’ incentives as follows. Given that each fund provides a volatility hedge, each fund
investor is encouraged to increase Xt when the market return volatility σ
market
t increases
(i.e., when St increases). In response to the increased Xt, each manager decreases θt to
balance his personal risk exposure; this consistently translates back into the lower fund
return volatility σfundt , indeed providing the volatility hedge.
6 Long-lived Agents
This section studies a model with infinitely-lived agents and shows that our main results
in the overlapping-generations model still carry through.
This section’s model is much like the one of Section 2 except that the agents are in-
finitely lived; unless otherwise noted, the same assumptions prevail. The agents have util-
ity function ui(cit) = − exp(−γ˜icit) for i ∈ {f,m, d}, where cit is consumption and γ˜i > 0 is
a coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Due to the model’s recursive nature, it is convenient
to define a “time-adjusted” CARA coefficient γi ≡ r
1+r
γ˜i. For i ∈ {f,m, d}, each agent’s
objective function in period t is her/his lifetime expected utility Et
[∑∞
τ=0 ρ
τui(cit+τ )
]
,
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor common for all agents.
In each period t + 1, each fund investor pays fee Ft+1 to the manager. Since Ft+1
compensates the manager for the investment he made in period t (which yields a return
in period t+ 1), we allow Ft+1 to depend not only on the fund profit Πt+1 but also on the
period-t investment profile (θt, Xt) and the period-t state variable St. At the beginning
of t = 0, the fund investors collectively offer a fee schedule, represented by a function
F (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St), to the manager. We allow F to be any function. If the manager
accepts F in t = 0, then for all t ≥ 0 the fee in that fund will be Ft+1 = F (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St).
Note that, while the functional form of F is determined in t = 0 and does not change
thereafter, the value of the fee Ft+1 changes every period, depending on the realizations
of (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St).
We assume that each manager can abscond in any period t ≥ 0.38 If he absconds in
period t, then he acts as a direct investor from period t + 1 onward.39 The story behind
this assumption is that if a manager ever deceives investors, his name would be mud and
38As in the model of Section 2, each manager who absconds in period t is not allowed to change θt in
that period. However, as shown in Appendix G.7, the results would not change even if we allow him to
modify θt when absconding.
39While acting as a direct investor, his risk aversion is still represented by γm (instead of γd).
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he can never come back to the profession; he lives the rest of his life as an individual
investor, using the investors’ money he absconded with as seed money. When offering F
in t = 0, the fund investors make sure that the manager will never have an incentive to
abscond in the future. That is, they consider incentive compatibility constraints a` la (2.7)
for each and every period t ≥ 0 (see Appendix F for details).
We look for a linear equilibrium in which Pt is linear in δˆ and St. The equilibrium
is derived in Appendix F, using the standard dynamic programming technique. The
following proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 6.1 (Long-lived agents). Define pi ≡ β
ξγm
+ 1−α
γd
, η ≡ σ2
pi
, qd1 ≡ σ
2σ2s
rpi2+σ2σ2s
, qd2 ≡
σ2
(
1 + σ
2σ2s
r(rpi2+σ2σ2s)
)
, and Ad ≡ σ2
rpi2
, and let (ζX , q
f
1 , q
m
1 , q
f
2 , q
m
2 , q3, q4, A
f , Am) be the solu-
tions to the system of nine equations:
ζX =
pi2
(1 + r)ξ3γm2
(
γmξσ2
(
1− ξ + q3
r
)
− β
α
q4
)
, (6.1)
qi1 =
Aiσ2s
1 + Aiσ2s
for i ∈ {f,m}, (6.2)
qi2 = σ
2
R −
η2σ2sq
i
1
r2
for i ∈ {f,m}, (6.3)
q3 = (1− φ)qf1 + φqm1 − ξqd1 , (6.4)
q4 = γ
f (1− φ)2qf2 + γm
α
β
(
φ2qm2 − ξ2qd2
)
, (6.5)
Af =
1
1 + r
(
γfβ2q4
γm2α2ξ2pi2
+
Af
1 + Afσ2s
− γ
fβ
γmα
(
Ad
1 + Adσ2s
− A
m
1 + Amσ2s
))
, and (6.6)
Am = Ad + 2γmξζX . (6.7)
Then, in equilibrium,
1. the stock return and price characterizations are similar to those of the short-lived
agents case (Proposition 4.1) with η∗∗ being replaced by η = σ2/pi,
2. each fund’s fee schedule is F (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St) = φΠt+1 + Q(θt, Xt, St), where φ ≡
βγf/(αγm + βγf ) and
Q(θt, Xt, St) ≡
(
ξ
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
− φ
(
1 +
qm1
r
))
ηStθtXt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2qd2 − φ2qm2 )θ2tX2t
+ ξ(1 + r)Xt +
1
2γm
β
α
((
qd1 − qm1
σ2s
)
S2t + ln
(
1− qm1
1− qd1
))
, (6.8)
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3. each fund’s size (i.e., assets under management) is (α/β)Xt = ζXS
2
t , and
4. each fund buys (α/β)θtXt shares of the stock, where
θt =
ζθ
St
with ζθ ≡ (1 + r)ξ
2γmpi
γmξσ2
(
1− ξ + q3
r
)
− β
α
q4
. (6.9)
The equilibrium characterization of the long-lived agents case is more complicated
than that of the overlapping-generations case due to the agents’ concerns for hedging
against stochastic variation of St, which are captured by q
i
1, i ∈ {f,m, d}. Nevertheless,
the implications drawn from these two cases are similar. Indeed, all the qualitative results
presented in Section 5 carry through also in this section’s model. First, because we have
dη/dα > 0 and dη/dβ < 0 in this section’s model, both µmarkett = Rˆt/Pt = rηSt/(δˆ− ηSt)
and SRmarkett = (η/σR)St increase with α and decrease with β (Result 1), and the same
applies to Vart[Pt+1] = η
2σ2s/r
2 (Result 2). Second, since in both models the fee Ft+1 is
an affine function of Πt+1 where Qt is an affine function of S
2
t , the qualitative implication
of Result 3 is still derived from this section’s model.40 Third, in both Sections 4 and 6, in
equilibrium Rˆt, Xt, θt, and Kt are proportional to St, S
2
t , 1/St, and St, respectively. So
the two models’ endogenous variables move in the same direction over time, and hence
Results 4, 5, and 6 hold also in this section’s model.41
How does the assumption of long-lived agents change their behavior and stock price?
Figure 5 plots the key endogenous variables of the long-lived agents model of this section
(solid line) and those of the overlapping generations model of Section 2 (dashed line)
as functions of the volatility σ2s of stock supply. The overlapping-generations case is
straightforward. As σ2s increases, the agents demand a higher risk premium, pushing up
Rˆt (panel (a)). This encourages fund investors to increase Xt (panel (b)), which then
40Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) also consider a multi-period problem of portfolio delegation, but a linear
fee is not optimal in their model. Why is it not optimal in theirs, while it is in ours? In Section 6 of Cuoco
and Kaniel (2011), the authors argue that the critical assumption that prevents a linear fee from being
optimal is that investors take the fee structure as given and do not internalize the fact that their choice of
capital allocation affects the equilibrium fee. The authors note (page 289): “If fund investors were able to
choose the managers’ compensation contract while committing to delegating the amount [...], this [linear]
fee would indeed be optimal.” By contrast, in our model the fund investors choose the fee structure,
and each of them fully internalizes how her choice of capital allocation Xt will affect the equilibrium fee
because the load component Qt is a function of Xt (as opposed to Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) in which the
load component is assumed to be a constant). Consequently, a linear fee is still optimal in our setting,
consistent with the standard results such as Wilson (1968) and Ross (1973).
41Moreover, the funds’ aggregate stock holding, αθtXt =
β
ξγmpiSt, and the direct investors’ aggregate
stock holding, (1− α)Kt = 1−αγdpi St, are also the same as those of Section 4 (see Footnote 24).
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Figure 5: Long-lived-agents model vs. overlapping-generations (OLG) model. The graphs
plot the key endogenous variables versus the volatility σ2s of stock supply. The parameter
values are σ2 = 1, r = 0.02, ξ = 0.01, γf = γm = γd = 1, α = 0.4, β = 0.0006, and
St = 1.
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leads the manager to decrease θt to counterbalance his personal risk exposure (panel (c)).
The funds’ aggregate stock holding αθtXt is independent of σ
2
s because the increase in Xt
and decrease in θt just offset each other (panel (d)). If σ
2
s = 0, even the long-lived agents
choose mean-variance solutions and thus the two models’ solutions coincide in all four
panels. However, for σ2s > 0 the long-lived agents’ hedging demand creates discrepancies
between the models. The expected return Rˆt is independent of σ
s
s in the long-lived agents
case (panel (a)). This is because an increase in σ2s has two opposing effects on Rˆt. First,
it increases risk premium, having an upward pressure on Rˆt; second, it increases hedging
demand, having an upward pressure on Pt, i.e., a downward pressure on Rˆt. These two
effects just offset each other, leading to dRˆt/dσ
2
s = 0. Despite dRˆt/dσ
2
s = 0, each fund
investor’s Xt increases with σ
2
s (panel (b)) because her hedging demand increases with
σ2s . The increase in Xt is moderate compared to the overlapping-generations case, in
which Rˆt increases with σ
2
s to drive up Xt more sharply. As a best response to such a
moderate increase in Xt, the manager’s θt decreases with σ
2
s also moderately (panel (c)).
The funds’ aggregate stock holding αθtXt is independent of σ
2
s also in the long-lived agents
case because, again, the increase in Xt and decrease in θt just cancel out (panel (d)).
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of asset-market equilibrium that incorporates delegated port-
folio management with optimal fee contracts. Fund managers and investors strategically
interact to determine funds’ investment profiles, while they share the funds’ portfolio risk
via fee contracts. In equilibrium, their investment decisions, fee schedules, and stock
prices feed back into one another. The model yields a number of empirical implications
for fund size, fund fees, funds’ investment strategies, stock market returns, and fund
returns. It predicts that expected stock returns and price volatility tend to be high
when a large fraction of investors access the market indirectly through a small number
of funds (the risk concentration effect). Explanations are provided to the empirical facts
documented in the literature: (1) a positive relation between aggregate fund flows and
subsequent stock returns and a negative relation between returns and subsequent flows,
and (2) funds’ counter-cyclical volatility timing. Moreover, new testable implications on
the distributions of market return and fund return are offered: (1) expected fund return
is less volatile than expected market return, and (2) funds use leverage counter-cyclically
to balance their risk exposure, that is, funds provide investors with a volatility hedge.
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In our model, time variation of variables is caused by exogenous supply shocks (or
noise trading). It will be a fruitful future research to endogeneize these shocks to study
the welfare implications of portfolio delegation. Given the policy debates about the effect
of financial intermediaries on the real economy, such a study will be important.
A limitation of our model is that it does not allow us to analyze cross-sectional varia-
tions of funds. Indeed, in equilibrium fund returns are perfectly correlated, and all funds
have the same size. These are clearly counterfactual. For future research, it will be inter-
esting to consider heterogeneities of funds (such as investment styles or managers’ skill),
possibly in a multiple-stock setting, and explore the interactions of funds’ investment
profiles and returns, manager compensations, and asset prices.
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Online Appendix:
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A Proof of Lemma 4.1
For an arbitrary investment profile (θt, Xt), generation-t fund investors choose fee schedule Ft(·) that
maximizes the expected utility of each of them, subject to the manager’s incentive compatibility con-
straint. The manager’s participation constraint, Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ≥ Et[um(0)], is slack because it is implied
by the incentive compatibility constraint. That is, the problem is
max
Ft(·)
Et
[
uf (W ft+1)
]
sub. to Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ≥ Et [um(W˜mt+1)] . (A.1)
The Lagrangian is
L =
∫
uf (Π− Ft(Π) + (1 + r)W ) gt(Π)dΠ− ψt
(
Et
[
um(W˜mt+1)
]
−
∫
um
(
α
β
Ft(Π)
)
gt(Π)dΠ
)
,
where gt(·) is the probability density function (conditional on t) of the fund profit Πt+1, and ψt is the
Lagrange multiplier. The first-order condition (FOC) for Ft(Πt+1) is
−uf ′ (Πt+1 − Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)W ) gt(Πt+1) + ψtum′
(
α
β
Ft(Πt+1)
)
α
β
gt(Πt+1) = 0
⇐⇒
um′
(
α
βFt(Πt+1)
)
uf ′ (Πt+1 − Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)W ) =
β
α
1
ψt
. (A.2)
Log-differentiating (A.2) with respect to Πt+1,
um′′(Wmt+1)
um′(Wmt+1)
α
β
F ′t (Πt+1)−
uf ′′(W ft+1)
uf ′(W ft+1)
(1− F ′t (Πt+1)) = 0
⇐⇒ −γmα
β
F ′t (Πt+1) + γ
f (1− F ′t (Πt+1)) = 0 ⇐⇒ F ′t (Πt+1) =
βγf
αγm + βγf
≡ φ. (A.3)
(A.3) implies that the optimal fee schedule is
Ft(Πt+1) = φΠt+1 +Qt
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for some Qt that is known as of period t. The fund investors choose Qt such that the manager’s incentive
compatibility constraint (A.1) holds with equality, since otherwise they can be better off by decreasing
Qt until (A.1) binds. Thus, recalling that the manager has exponential utility, Qt satisfies
Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
]
= Et
[
um(W˜mt+1)
]
⇐⇒ Et
[
Wmt+1
]− γm
2
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
= Et
[
W˜mt+1
]
− γ
m
2
Vart
[
W˜mt+1
]
⇐⇒ α
β
(φEt [Πt+1] +Qt)− γ
m
2
α2
β2
φ2Vart [Πt+1] =
α
β
ξEt [Yt+1]− γ
m
2
α2
β2
ξ2Vart [Yt+1]
⇐⇒ φEt [Πt+1] +Qt − γ
m
2
α
β
φ2Vart [Πt+1] = ξEt [Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
ξ2Vart [Πt+1]
⇐⇒ Qt = (ξ − φ)Et [Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Πt+1] .
B Proof of Lemma 4.2
Given Ft(·) specified in Lemma 4.1, each fund investor’s terminal wealth (2.5) is rewritten as
W ft+1 = (1− φ)Πt+1 − (ξ − φ) Et[Πt+1]− ξ(1 + r)Xt +
γm
2
α
β
(
ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1] + (1 + r)W,
which implies that the mean and variance of W ft+1 are
Et
[
W ft+1
]
= (1− ξ)Et [Πt+1]− ξ(1 + r)Xt + γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1] + (1 + r)W and (B.1)
Vart
[
W ft+1
]
= (1− φ)2Vart [Πt+1] . (B.2)
Since each fund investor has exponential utility, (B.1) and (B.2) imply that her maximization problem is
max
Xt
Et
[
uf (W ft+1)
] ⇐⇒ max
Xt
Et
[
W ft+1
]− γf
2
Vart
[
W ft+1
]
⇐⇒ max
Xt
(1− ξ)Et [Πt+1]− ξ(1 + r)Xt + (1 + r)W − γ
m
2
α
β
(
−ξ2 + φ2 + βγ
f
αγm
(1− φ)2
)
Vart[Πt+1]
⇐⇒ max
Xt
(1− ξ)RˆtθtXt − ξ(1 + r)Xt + (1 + r)W − γ
m
2
α
β
(φ− ξ2)θ2tX2t σ2R.
The FOC for Xt, assuming interior solution, is
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt − ξ(1 + r)− γmα
β
(φ− ξ2)θ2tXtσ2R = 0.
This yields the fund investor’s best response to θt given Rˆt:
X(θt; Rˆt) =
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt − ξ(1 + r)
γmαβ (φ− ξ2)σ2Rθ2t
.
Taking care of the nonnegativity condition for Xt yields the required result.
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C Proof of Lemma 4.3
Under fee schedule Ft(·) of Lemma 4.1, each manager’s terminal wealth (2.4) is rewritten as
Wmt+1 =
α
β
(φΠt+1 +Qt)
=
α
β
(
φΠt+1 + (ξ − φ)Et[Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1]
)
,
which implies that the mean and variance of Wmt+1 are
Et
[
Wmt+1
]
=
α
β
(
ξEt[Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1]
)
and (C.1)
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
=
α2
β2
φ2Vart [Πt+1] . (C.2)
Since the manager has exponential utility, (C.1) and (C.2) imply that his maximization problem is
max
θt
Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ⇐⇒ max
θt
Et
[
Wmt+1
]− γm
2
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
⇐⇒ max
θt
α
β
ξEt[Πt+1] +
α
β
ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α2
β2
ξ2Vart[Πt+1]
⇐⇒ max
θt
α
β
ξXt
(
Rˆtθt + (1 + r)− γ
m
2
α
β
ξθ2tXtσ
2
R
)
.
The FOC for θt is
Rˆt − γmα
β
ξθtXtσ
2
R = 0.
This yields the manager’s best response to Xt given Rˆt:
θ(Xt; Rˆt) =
βRˆt
γmαξσ2RXt
.
D Proof of Proposition 4.2
The fixed fee Qt is computed as follows. In equilibrium, the conditional mean and variance of Πt+1 are
Et[Πt+1] = Rˆtθ
∗
tX
∗
t =
(
βσ2R
αξγm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t and (D.1)
Vart[Πt+1] = θ
∗2
t X
∗2
t σ
2
R =
(
β2σ2R
α2ξ2γm2
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t . (D.2)
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Using (D.1) and (D.2), we have
Qt =(ξ − φ)
(
βσ2R
αξγm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t + ξ(1 + r)
(
β(ξ − φ)σ2R
γm(1 + r)αξ3
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t
− γ
m
2
α
β
(
ξ2 − φ2)( β2σ2R
α2ξ2γm2
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t
=
(
β(ξ − φ)σ2R
αξγm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)(
1 +
1
ξ
− ξ + φ
2ξ
)
S2t =
(
β(ξ − φ)(ξ − φ+ 2)σ2R
2αξ2γm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t .
E Proof of Corollary 4.1
We have
µfundt = Et
[
Ωfundt+1
]
= Et
[
Πt+1 − Ft(Πt+1)
X∗t
]
=
1
X∗t
((1− φ)Et[Πt+1]−Qt)
=
(
γm(1 + r)αξ3
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
β(ξ − φ)σ2R
)
1
S2t
( (1− φ)βσ2R
αξγm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t −
(
β(ξ − φ)(ξ − φ+ 2)σ2R
2αξ2γm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
)
S2t

=
(1 + r)ξ
ξ − φ
(
(1− φ)ξ − (ξ − φ)(ξ − φ+ 2)
2
)
=
(1 + r)ξ
(
φ− ξ2+φ22
)
ξ − φ
and
σfundt =
√
Vart
[
Ωfundt+1
]
=
1
X∗t
(1− φ)
√
Vart[Πt+1]
=
(
γm(1 + r)αξ3
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)2
β(ξ − φ)σ2R
)
1
S2t
(
(1− φ)βσR
αξγm
(
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
))|St|
=
(
(1 + r)ξ2(1− φ)( βξγm + 1−αγd )
(ξ − φ)σR
)
1
|St| .
F Proof of Proposition 6.1
F.1 Dynamic budget constraints
Each fund investor allocates her wealth W ft between consumption c
f
t , capital allocation Xt to the fund,
and investment in the riskless asset to maximize her lifetime expected utility. Her dynamic budget
constraint is
W ft+1 = Πt+1 − Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)(W ft − cft ), (F.1)
which states that her next-period wealth is the sum of the after-fee fund return and the proceeds from
her own riskless investment.
Each fund manager allocates his wealth Wmt between consumption c
m
t and investment in the riskless
asset, and chooses the fund’s risk exposure θt to maximize his lifetime expected utility. His dynamic
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budget constraint if he continues his fund until period t+ 1 is
Wmt+1 =
α
β
Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)(W
m
t − cmt ). (F.2)
If he absconds in a certain period, his next-period wealth would be
W˜mt+1 =
α
β
ξYt+1 + (1 + r)(W
m
t − cmt )
=
α
β
ξ (Πt+1 + (1 + r)Xt) + (1 + r)(W
m
t − cmt ). (F.3)
After this period onward, he acts as a direct investor; thus, his dynamic budget constraint would be
W˜mt+1 = Rt+1K˜
m
t + (1 + r)(W˜
m
t − c˜mt ), (F.4)
where K˜mt and c˜
m
t are his stock purchase and consumption, respectively.
Each direct investor allocates her wealth W dt between consumption c
d
t , purchase of Kt shares of the
stock, and investment in the riskless asset to maximize her lifetime expected utility. Her dynamic budget
constraint is
W dt+1 = Rt+1Kt + (1 + r)(W
d
t − cdt ). (F.5)
F.2 Conjectures
We conjecture and later verify that each agent’s value function is, for i ∈ {f,m, d},
V i(W it , St) = − exp
(
−γiW it −
Ai
2
S2t −Bi
)
, (F.6)
where Ai and Bi are constants that will be determined later. Moreover, conjecture and later verify that
the value function of a manager who has absconded is
V˜ m(W˜mt , St) = − exp
(
−γmW˜mt −
Ad
2
S2t −Bd
)
. (F.7)
Note that (F.7) is characterized by Ad and Bd (as opposed to Am and Bm), reflecting that he acts as a
direct investor after absconding. We also conjecture and verify later that the equilibrium stock price is
Pt =
δˆ − ηSt
r
, (F.8)
where η > 0 is a constant that is determined later. This conjecture implies that, conditional on t, Rt+1
is normally distributed with mean
Rˆt ≡ Et[Rt+1] = ηSt (F.9)
and variance σ2R ≡ Vart[Rt+1] = σ2 + η2σ2s/r2. From (F.8) and (F.9), we have Pt = (δˆ − Rˆt)/r.
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F.3 Fee contract
At the beginning of period 0, the fund investors collectively choose fee schedule F (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St) that
maximizes the period-0 value of each of them, V f (W f0 , S0), subject to the manager’s incentive compati-
bility constraints. Note that V f represents the investor’s value given that the manager never absconds in
the future. So, when maximizing V f , the investors ensure that the manager will not have an incentive to
abscond at all times by considering his incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for each and every t ≥ 0.
That is, the optimal schedule F is the solution to the following problem.
max
F
V f (W f0 , S0)
sub. to Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
] ≥ Et[V˜ m(W˜mt+1, St+1)] for all t ≥ 0. (F.10)
The manager’s participation constraint, E0
[
V m(Wm1 , S1)
] ≥ E0[V˜ m(0, S1)], is omitted because it is
implied by IC (F.10). Note that (F.10) is characterized by Et[·] rather than E0[·], despite the fact that
the maximization problem is solved in period 0, because (F.10) is concerning the manager’s incentive to
continue or abscond as of period t.
Conjecture and verify later that ICs for all t ≥ 1 are redundant, that is, the solution to the problem
with IC for only t = 0 satisfies ICs for all t ≥ 1. Moreover, from the fund investor’s Bellman equation
V f (W ft , St) = max
cft ,Xt
{
uf (cft ) + ρEt
[
V f (W ft+1, St+1)
]}
, (F.11)
maximizing V f (W f0 , S0) amounts to maximizing E0
[
V f (W f1 , S1)
]
. So the original problem reduces to:
max
F
E0
[
V f (W f1 , S1)
]
sub. to E0
[
V m(Wm1 , S1)
] ≥ E0[V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1)]. (F.12)
The Lagrangian is
L =
∫ ∫
V f
(
Π1 − F1 + (1 + r)(W f0 − cf0 ), S1
)
g(Π1, S1)dΠ1dS1
− ψ
(
E0
[
V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1)
]− ∫ ∫ V m(α
β
F1 + (1 + r)(W
m
0 − cm0 ), S1
)
g(Π1, S1)dΠ1dS1
)
,
where F1 ≡ F (Π1, θ0, X0, S0), g(·, ·) is the probability density function of Π1 and S1, and ψ is the Lagrange
multiplier. Let VA(A,B,C) denote the partial derivative of function V with respect to A. Then the FOC
for F1 is
− V fW
(
Π1 − F1 + (1 + r)(W f0 − cf0 ), S1
)
g(Π1, S1)
+ ψV mW
(
α
β
F1 + (1 + r)(W
m
0 − cm0 ), S1
)
α
β
g(Π1, S1) = 0
⇐⇒
V mW
(
α
βF1 + (1 + r)(W
m
0 − cm0 ), S1
)
V fW
(
Π1 − F1 + (1 + r)(W f0 − cf0 ), S1
) = β
α
1
ψ
. (F.13)
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Log-differentiating (F.13) with respect to Π1,
V mWW (W
m
1 , S1)
V mW (W
m
1 , S1)
α
β
FΠ(Π1, θ0, X0, S0)− V
f
WW (W
f
1 , S1)
V fW (W
f
1 , S1)
(1− FΠ(Π1, θ0, X0, S0)) = 0
⇐⇒ FΠ(Π1, θ0, X0, S0) = βγ
f
αγm + βγf
≡ φ. (F.14)
(F.14) implies that F (Π1, θ0, X0, S0) = φΠ1 +Q(θ0, X0, S0) for some function Q. Thus, for general t ≥ 0
we have
F (Πt+1, θt, Xt, St) = φΠt+1 +Q(θt, Xt, St). (F.15)
Now, let us determine Q. In period 0, the fund investors set Q so that the manager’s IC binds:
E0
[
V m(Wm1 , S1)
]
= E0
[
V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1)
]
. (F.16)
To solve (F.16) for Q, first we need to obtain the explicit expressions of the left-hand side (LHS) and
RHS of (F.16).
First, let us compute the LHS of (F.16). Conjecture (F.6) implies that (we use an identity Rt+1 =
Rˆt + (δt+1 − δˆ) + ηrSt − ηrSt+1 and denote Q0 ≡ Q(θ0, X0, S0))
V m(Wm1 , S1) = − exp
(
−γmWm1 −
Am
2
S21 −Bm
)
= − exp
(
−γm
(
α
β
(φR1θ0X0 +Q0) + (1 + r)(W
m
0 − cm0 )
)
− A
m
2
S21 −Bm
)
(F.17)
= − exp
(
−γmα
β
(
φRˆ0θ0X0 + φ(δ1 − δˆ)θ0X0 + φη
r
S0θ0X0 +Q0
)
− γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
× exp
(
γm
α
β
φ
η
r
θ0X0S1 − A
m
2
S21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
. (F.18)
In (i) of (F.18), the only random variable is δ1, whereas S1 is the only random variable in (ii). Since δ1 and
S1 are independent, the conditional expectation of V
m(Wm1 , S1) is written as a product: E0 [V
m(Wm1 , S1)] =
−E0 [(i)] E0 [(ii)] . First, E0
[
(i)
]
is
E0
[
(i)
]
= exp
(
−γmα
β
(
φRˆ0θ0X0 + φ
η
r
S0θ0X0 +Q0 − γ
m
2
α
β
φ2θ20X
2
0σ
2
)
− γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bm
)
.
(F.19)
Second, E0
[
(ii)
]
is obtained by using the following fact of normal calculus:
Fact 1. If x is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2 then
E
[
exp
(
−ax− b
2
x2
)]
= exp
(
−1
2
ln(1 + bσ2)− 1
1 + bσ2
(
aµ− a
2
2
σ2 +
b
2
µ2
))
, (F.20)
where a and b are constants.
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Setting x = S1, a = −γmαβφηr θ0X0, b = Am, µ = S0 and σ2 = σ2s in Fact 1, we have
E0 [(ii)] = exp
(
−1
2
ln(1 +Amσ2s)−
1
1 +Amσ2s
(
− γmα
β
φ
η
r
θ0X0S0 − γ
m2
2
α2
β2
φ2
η2
r2
θ20X
2
0σ
2
s +
Am
2
S20
))
.
(F.21)
Thus, from (F.19) and (F.21) we have
E0 [V
m(Wm1 , S1)] = −E0 [(i)] E0 [(ii)]
= − exp
 −γmαβφ((Rˆ0 + ηr qm1 S0) θ0X0 − γm2 αβφqm2 θ20X20)− γmαβQ0
+ 12 ln(1− qm1 )− 12 q
m
1
σ2s
S20 − γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bm
 , (F.22)
where
qi1 ≡
Aiσ2s
1 +Aiσ2s
for i ∈ {f,m, d} (F.23)
and
qi2 ≡ σ2 +
η2σ2s
r2
1 +Aiσ2s
= σ2 +
η2σ2s
r2
− η
2σ2s
r2
Aiσ2s
1 +Aiσ2s
= σ2R −
η2σ2sq
i
1
r2
for i ∈ {f,m, d}. (F.24)
Next, let us compute the RHS of (F.16), E0
[
V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1)
]
. Conjecture (F.7) implies that
V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1) = − exp
(
−γmW˜m1 −
Ad
2
S21 −Bd
)
= − exp
(
−γm
(
α
β
ξ (R1θ0X0 + (1 + r)X0) + (1 + r)(W
m
0 − cm0 )
)
− A
d
2
S21 −Bd
)
. (F.25)
Following the steps from (F.17) to (F.22) again, we have
E0
[
V˜ m(W˜m1 , S1)
]
= − exp
 −γmαβ ξ ((Rˆ0 + ηr qd1S0) θ0X0 − γm2 αβ ξqd2θ20X20)− γmαβ ξ(1 + r)X0
+ 12 ln(1− qd1)− 12 q
d
1
σ2s
S20 − γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bd
 . (F.26)
Now, plugging (F.22) and (F.26) into (F.16), we have
− γmα
β
φ
((
Rˆ0 +
η
r
qm1 S0
)
θ0X0 − γ
m
2
α
β
φqm2 θ
2
0X
2
0
)
− γmα
β
Q0
+
1
2
ln(1− qm1 )−
1
2
qm1
σ2s
S20 − γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bm
=− γmα
β
ξ
((
Rˆ0 +
η
r
qd1S0
)
θ0X0 − γ
m
2
α
β
ξqd2θ
2
0X
2
0
)
− γmα
β
ξ(1 + r)X0
+
1
2
ln(1− qd1)−
1
2
qd1
σ2s
S20 − γm(1 + r)(Wm0 − cm0 )−Bd. (F.27)
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Solving (F.27) for Q0 and noting that Rˆ0 = ηS0 (see (F.9)), we have
Q0 =
(
ξ
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
− φ
(
1 +
qm1
r
))
ηS0θ0X0 − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2qd2 − φ2qm2 )θ20X20
+ ξ(1 + r)X0 +
1
2γm
β
α
((
qd1 − qm1
σ2s
)
S20 + ln
(
1− qm1
1− qd1
)
+ 2(Bd −Bm)
)
. (F.28)
Thus, for general t ≥ 0 we have
Q(θt, Xt, St) =
(
ξ
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
− φ
(
1 +
qm1
r
))
ηStθtXt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2qd2 − φ2qm2 )θ2tX2t
+ ξ(1 + r)Xt +
1
2γm
β
α
((
qd1 − qm1
σ2s
)
S2t + ln
(
1− qm1
1− qd1
)
+ 2(Bd −Bm)
)
. (F.29)
As shown later, we have Bm = Bd in equilibrium (see (F.60) in Section F.9.1 and (F.67) in Section F.9.3).
Thus, the term 2(Bd −Bm) in (F.29) is zero, and we obtain (6.8) of Proposition 6.1.
Last, we can readily verify our conjecture that the fee schedule (F.15) satisfies ICs for all t ≥ 1 (with
equalities) by plugging (F.15) and (F.29) into those ICs. This is not surprising: since we obtained Q0
from the binding IC for t = 0, if we replace t = 0 with an arbitrary t, Qt should satisfy IC for that period
with equality too.
F.4 Fund manager’s optimization
Each fund manager’s Bellman equation is
V m(Wmt , St) = max
cmt ,θt
{
um(cmt ) + ρEt
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]}
. (F.30)
Plugging (F.15) and (F.29) into the period-t version of (F.22) and rearranging, we have
Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 −γmαβ ξ ((Rˆt + ηr qd1St) θtXt + (1 + r)Xt − γm2 αβ ξqd2θ2tX2t )
+ 12 ln(1− qd1)− 12 q
d
1
σ2s
S2t − γm(1 + r)(Wmt − cmt )−Bd
 . (F.31)
The FOC for θt is ∂Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]
/∂θt = 0, which is equivalent to(
Rˆt +
η
r
qd1St
)
Xt − γmα
β
ξqd2θtX
2
t = 0. (F.32)
Therefore, given that there is a mass α/β of fund investors in his fund, each of whom invests Xt > 0
dollars of capital, each manager’s optimal choice of risk exposure given Rˆt is
θt(Xt; Rˆt) =
Rˆt +
η
r q
d
1St
γmαβ ξq
d
2Xt
. (F.33)
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F.5 Fund investor’s optimization
Conjecture (F.6) implies that each fund investor’s next-period value function is
V f (W ft+1, St+1) = − exp
(
−γfW ft+1 −
Af
2
S2t+1 −Bf
)
= − exp
(
−γf
(
(1− φ)Rt+1θtXt −Qt + (1 + r)(W ft − cft )
)
− A
f
2
S2t+1 −Bf
)
. (F.34)
Repeating the steps from (F.17) to (F.22) (for an arbitrary period t rather than period 0), we have
Et
[
V f (W ft+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 −γf (1− φ)((Rˆt + ηr qf1St) θtXt − γf2 (1− φ)qf2 θ2tX2t )+ γfQt
+ 12 ln(1− qf1 )− 12
qf1
σ2s
S2t − γf (1 + r)(W ft − cft )−Bf
 .
(F.35)
Plugging (F.29) into (F.35) and rearranging, we have
Et
[
V f (W ft+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
(
−γf
(
(1− ξ)RˆtθtXt + ηr q3StθtXt − ξ(1 + r)Xt − 12q4θ2tX2t
)
− 12z1S2t − z2 − γf (1 + r)(W ft − cft )
)
, (F.36)
where q3 ≡ (1− φ)qf1 + φqm1 − ξqd1 , (F.37)
q4 ≡ γf (1− φ)2 qf2 + γm
α
β
(
φ2qm2 − ξ2qd2
)
, (F.38)
z1 ≡ q
f
1
σ2s
− γ
f
γm
β
α
(
qd1 − qm1
σ2s
)
, and (F.39)
z2 ≡ Bf − 1
2
ln(1− qf1 )−
γf
γm
β
α
(
1
2
ln
(
1− qm1
1− qd1
)
+Bd −Bm
)
. (F.40)
Assuming positive solution, the FOC for Xt is ∂Et
[
V f (W ft+1, St+1)
]
/∂Xt = 0, i.e.,
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt + η
r
q3Stθt − ξ(1 + r)− q4θ2tXt = 0. (F.41)
Thus, given θt and Rˆt, each fund investor’s optimal capital allocation is
Xt(θt; Rˆt) = max
{
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt + ηr q3Stθt − ξ(1 + r)
q4θ2t
, 0
}
. (F.42)
F.6 Direct investor’s optimization
The Bellman equation of each direct investor is
V d(W dt , St) = max
cdt ,Kt
{
ud(cdt ) + ρEt
[
V d(W dt+1, St+1)
]}
. (F.43)
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Conjecture (F.6) implies that the next-period value function of each direct investor is
V d(W dt+1, St+1) = − exp
(
−γdW dt+1 −
Ad
2
S2t+1 −Bd
)
= − exp
(
−γd (Rt+1Kt + (1 + r)(W dt − cdt ))− Ad2 S2t+1 −Bd
)
. (F.44)
Following the steps from (F.17) to (F.22), we have
Et
[
V d(W dt+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 −γd ((Rˆt + ηr qd1St)Kt − γd2 qd2K2t )
+ 12 ln(1− qd1)− 12 q
d
1
σ2s
S2t − γd(1 + r)(W dt − cdt )−Bd
 . (F.45)
The FOC for Kt, ∂Et
[
V d(W dt+1, St+1)
]
/∂Kt = 0, yields her optimal stock purchase:
Rˆt +
η
r
qd1St − γdqd2Kt = 0 ⇐⇒ Kt(Rˆt) =
Rˆt +
η
r q
d
1St
γdqd2
. (F.46)
F.7 Fund’s investment profile given Rˆt
As in Lemma 4.4, the unique pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium investment profile given Rˆt, (θt(Rˆt), Xt(Rˆt)),
is obtained by solving the two best response functions, (F.33) and (F.42), for θt and Xt:
θt(Rˆt) =
(1 + r)ξ2γmαβ q
d
2(
ξ(1− ξ)γmαβ qd2 − q4
)
Rˆt +
η
r
(
γmαβ ξq
d
2q3 − qd1q4
)
St
(F.47)
and
Xt(Rˆt) =
(
Rˆt +
η
r q
d
1St
)((
ξ(1− ξ)γmαβ qd2 − q4
)
Rˆt +
η
r
(
γmαβ ξq
d
2q3 − qd1q4
)
St
)
(1 + r)ξ3γm2 α
2
β2 q
d2
2
. (F.48)
F.8 Market clearing
Plugging (F.46), (F.47), and (F.48) into the market clearing condition and solving for Rˆt, we have
Rˆt =
(
qd2
β
γmξ +
1−α
γd
− η
r
qd1
)
St. (F.49)
For (F.9) and (F.49) to be consistent with each other, i.e., for conjecture (F.8) to be correct, we need
η =
qd2
β
γmξ +
1−α
γd
− η
r
qd1 ⇐⇒ η =
qd2(
β
γmξ +
1−α
γd
)(
1 +
qd1
r
) . (F.50)
Plugging Rˆt = ηSt into (F.47), (F.48), and (F.46) yields the equilibrium levels of θt, Xt, and Kt:
θt =
 (1 + r)ξ2γmαβ qd2(
γmαβ ξq
d
2
(
1− ξ + q3r
)
−
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
q4
)
η
 1
St
≡ ζθ 1
St
, (F.51)
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Xt =

(
1 +
qd1
r
)(
γmαβ ξq
d
2
(
1− ξ + q3r
)
−
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
q4
)
η2
(1 + r)ξ3γm2 α
2
β2 q
d2
2
S2t ≡ ζX βαS2t , and (F.52)
Kt =
η
γdqd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)
St. (F.53)
F.9 Value functions and consumptions
This section verifies value functions (F.6) and (F.7), and determine the agents’ consumption policies.
F.9.1 Fund managers
Plugging (F.51) and (F.52) into (F.31) and rearranging, we have
Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 − 12
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ 2γmξ(1 + r)ζX +
qd1
σ2s
)
S2t
+ 12 ln(1− qd1)− γm(1 + r)(Wmt − cmt )−Bd
 . (F.54)
For notational convenience, define
ϕmt ≡ − ln ρ+
1
2
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ 2γmξ(1 + r)ζX +
qd1
σ2s
)
S2t −
1
2
ln(1− qd1) +Bd. (F.55)
Then, recalling that γm ≡ r1+r γ˜m, the Bellman equation is
V m(Wmt , St) = max
cmt
{
− exp
(
−
(
1 + r
r
)
γmcmt
)
− exp (−ϕmt − γm(1 + r)(Wmt − cmt ))
}
. (F.56)
The FOC for cmt is(
1 + r
r
)
γm exp
(
−
(
1 + r
r
)
γmcmt
)
− exp(−ϕmt )γm(1 + r) exp (−γm(1 + r)(Wmt − cmt )) = 0,
which implies that his optimal consumption is an affine function of wealth Wmt :
cmt =
(
r
1 + r
)
Wmt +
r
γm(1 + r)2
(ϕmt − ln r). (F.57)
Plugging (F.57) into (F.56) yields
− exp
(
−γmWmt −
Am
2
S2t −Bm
)
= − exp
(
−γmWmt −
ϕmt
1 + r
)
r−
r
1+r (1 + r)
⇐⇒ 1
2
(1 + r)AmS2t + (1 + r)B
m
=
1
2
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ 2γmξ(1 + r)ζX +
qd1
σ2s
)
S2t − ln
ρ(1 + r)1+r
rr
− ln(1− q
d
1)
2
+Bd. (F.58)
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Comparing the coefficients of S2t and the constant terms in (F.58), we have
Am =
1
1 + r
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ 2γmξ(1 + r)ζX +
qd1
σ2s
)
and (F.59)
Bm =
1
1 + r
(
Bd − ln ρ(1 + r)
1+r
rr
− ln(1− q
d
1)
2
)
. (F.60)
Once we obtain Ad ((F.66) in Section F.9.3), we see that (F.59) is (6.7) in the main text. Also, once we
get Bd ((F.67) in Section F.9.3), we see from (F.60) that Bm = Bd.
F.9.2 Fund investors
Plugging (F.51) and (F.52) into (F.36) and rearranging, we have
Et
[
V f (W ft+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
(
−1
2
(
γfβ2q4η
2
γm2α2ξ2qd22
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ z1
)
S2t − z2 − γf (1 + r)(W ft − cft )
)
.
(F.61)
Following the steps from (F.54) to (F.60), we obtain the fund investor’s optimal consumption policy as
(F.57) with m replaced with f , and the equations for Af and Bf as
Af =
1
1 + r
(
γfβ2q4η
2
γm2α2ξ2qd22
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+ z1
)
and (F.62)
Bf =
1
1 + r
(
z2 − ln ρ(1 + r)
1+r
rr
)
. (F.63)
Plugging (F.39) into (F.62) yields (6.6). Plugging (F.40) with Bd = Bm into (F.63), we have
Bf =
1
r
(
− ln ρ(1 + r)
1+r
rr
− 1
2
ln(1− qf1 )−
1
2
γf
γm
β
α
ln
(
1− qm1
1− qd1
))
. (F.64)
F.9.3 Direct investors
Plugging (F.53) into (F.45) and rearranging, we have
Et
[
V d(W dt+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 − 12
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+
qd1
σ2s
)
S2t
+ 12 ln(1− qd1)− γd(1 + r)(W dt − cdt )−Bd
 . (F.65)
Following the steps from (F.54) to (F.60), we obtain the direct investor’s optimal consumption policy as
(F.57) with m replaced with d, and the equations for Ad and Bd as
Ad =
1
1 + r
(
η2
qd2
(
1 +
qd1
r
)2
+
qd1
σ2s
)
and (F.66)
Bd =
1
r
(
− ln ρ(1 + r)
1+r
rr
− ln
(
1− qd1
)
2
)
. (F.67)
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F.9.4 Fund managers who have absconded
The manager who has absconded acts as a direct investor. So his optimization problem is identical to
that of Section F.6 except that the risk-aversion coefficient is γm rather than γd. Likewise, his value
function (F.7) is verified as in Section F.9.3, replacing γd with γm.
F.10 Solving the system of equations
We can obtain closed-form solutions for (η, qd1 , q
d
2 , A
d) by solving the system of (F.50), (F.23) for i = d,
(F.24) for i = d, and (F.66). Plugging η = σ2/pi into (F.52), (F.51), and (F.62) yields (6.1), (6.9), and
(6.6), respectively.
G Robustness
G.1 Endogenous riskless rate
The model of Section 2 assumes an exogenous, constant riskless rate r. Although such an assumption is
standard in the literature, it is worth investigating what happens to our result if r is endogeneized.
Let us modify the model of Section 2 as follows. Each period, a one-period riskless bond is traded
in the market. The bond is in zero net supply, and each unit of the bond delivers one dollar in the next
period. Let qt denote the (endogenous) period-t bond price, and define the riskless rate by rt ≡ 1/qt− 1.
We focus on the case of nonstochastic supply: St = S > 0 for all t. We have not been able to solve the
case with stochastic supply (we will discuss the challenge later).
The model is solved in a similar fashion as Section 4. Conjecture and later verify that rt (and thus
qt) is constant over time in equilibrium, and that the equilibrium stock price is constant,
Pt = P ≡ δˆ − ηS
r
, (G.1)
for all t, where η is a constant that is determined later. These conjectures imply that the stock’s excess
return Rt+1 ≡ δt+1 + Pt+1 − (1 + r)Pt is, conditional on t, normally distributed with mean
Rˆ = ηS (G.2)
and variance σ2. Taking Rˆ and r as given, all the arguments in Sections 4.1–4.4 go through. The stock’s
market clearing yields, as in (4.8),
Rˆ =
σ2
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
S. (G.3)
For our conjectures to be correct, we need (G.2) and (G.3) to be consistent with each other, i.e.,
η =
σ2
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
. (G.4)
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The bond’s market clearing condition is
α
(
W −Xt
q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fund investors’ demand
+α
(
Xt − PtθtXt
q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
funds’ demand
+ (1− α)
(
W − PtKt
q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct investors’ demand
= 0 (G.5)
⇐⇒ W − Pt (αθtXt + (1− α)Kt) = 0. (G.6)
Plugging αθtXt + (1− α)Kt = S, (G.1), and (G.4) into (G.6) yields the equilibrium riskless rate:
r =
(
δˆ − σ
2S
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
)
S
W
. (G.7)
We can choose δˆ large enough to ensure that r > 0.
Do the results presented in Section 5 carry through under endogenous riskless rate? Since dRˆ/dα > 0
and dRˆ/dβ < 0, Result 1 still holds in this model. However, since we have not been able to solve the case
with endogenous riskless rate and stochastic stock supply St, we are unable to check the robustness of
the other results that rely on the assumption that St is stochastic. The challenge is the following. If St is
stochastic, the one-period riskless rate rt would also be stochastic, reflecting the agents’ asset demands
that depend on St. This means that the price conjecture of the form (G.1) would not work out. Intuitively,
it would be sensible to conjecture that the equilibrium price is of the form Pt = Et
[∑∞
ν=t
∏ν
τ=t
(
δν+1
1+rτ
)]
−
Z, where the first term is the expected discounted future payoffs and Z is the risk premium. However, the
whole analysis is very complicated with such a price function. We leave this problem for future research.
How does the extent of portfolio delegation as measured by (α, β) affect r? From (G.7), we have
dr/dα < 0 and dr/dβ > 0. The intuition is as follows. Given r, an increase in α and/or a decrease in β
increase Rˆ (see Result 1 for the intuition), lowering the stock price P = (δˆ − Rˆ)/r. This decreases the
stock market capitalization, PS, and therefore more investor capital flows into the bond market, that
is, (W − PS) increases. Thus, to clear the bond market, that is, to make the market less attractive for
investors, r decreases.
G.2 Stock supply process
In Section 2, we model the stock supply process as a random walk. While this specification simplifies
the analysis, it is more restrictive than needed. All of our results go through qualitatively under more
general AR(1) process
St = a0 + a1St−1 + t, (G.8)
where a0 ≥ 0 and a1 ∈ [0, 1] are constants and t is normal with mean 0 and variance σ2s > 0. Note that
(G.8) nests not only the one of Section 2 (a0 = 0 and a1 = 1) but also, for example, an i.i.d. process
(a0 > 0 and a1 = 0) and a mean-reverting process (a0 = ψS¯ and a1 = 1 − ψ where S¯ = E[St] and
ψ ∈ (0, 1)).
The equilibrium under (G.8) is determined as follows. Conjecture and later verify that the equilibrium
stock price is of the form
Pt =
δˆ − η(St + a0r )
r
, (G.9)
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where η is a constant that is determined later. This conjecture implies that the stock’s excess return
Rt+1 is, conditional on t, normally distributed with mean
Rˆt =
(
1 +
1− a1
r
)
ηSt (G.10)
and variance σ2R ≡ σ2 +η2σ2s/r2. Taking Rˆt as given, all the argument in Sections 4.1–4.4 carries through.
Market clearing yields, as in (4.8),
Rˆt =
σ2R
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
St. (G.11)
For (G.10) and (G.11) to be consistent with each other, we need(
1 +
1− a1
r
)
η =
σ2R
β
ξγm +
1−α
γd
. (G.12)
Solving (G.12) for η, in the stable equilibrium we have
η =
r2
2σ2s
(1 + 1− a1
r
)(
β
ξγm
+
1− α
γd
)
−
√(
1 +
1− a1
r
)2(
β
ξγm
+
1− α
γd
)2
− 4σ
2σ2s
r2
 . (G.13)
Since Rˆt is proportional to St and the proportionality constant
(
1 + 1−a1r
)
η is increasing in α and
decreasing in β, all the results presented in Sections 4 and 5 go through qualitatively. In the main text,
we focus on the random walk case because it keeps the analysis very simple, and assuming a0 > 0 and
a1 6= 1 does not yield much additional economic insights.
G.3 Fund investors’ choices of funds and funds’ competition
This section shows that each fund has a mass α/β of fund investors in equilibrium if each investor can
choose a fund to which to allocate capital. This result is not obvious because, a priori, we cannot exclude
the possibility of strategic complementarity, that is, each fund investor’s expected utility may increase
with the mass of investors in the fund. If that is the case, the equilibrium outcome would be that all fund
investors allocate capital to a single fund. In the following, we show that it is not the case: each fund
investor’s expected utility decreases with the mass of fund investors in that fund, and thus the investors
will optimally flow in and out of funds until every fund accommodates the same mass of investors. We
also show that fund managers are “perfectly competitive” in attracting investors, in the sense that each
manager takes the mass of fund investors choosing his fund as given, as he cannot strategically influence
the investors’ fund choices through his actions.
Suppose that each fund investor chooses a fund at the beginning of each period. Once all investors
have chosen funds, each fund determines the fee schedule Ft(·) and investment profile (θt, Xt), as in the
model of Section 2. Let N be the mass of fund investors who choose an arbitrary fund. In this fund,
each investor’s next-period wealth is given by (2.5), while that of the manager is Wmt = NFt(Πt+1) if he
continues the fund and W˜mt = ξNYt+1 if he absconds. The optimal fee schedule is obtained by replacing
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α/β with N in Lemma 4.1:
Ft(Πt+1) = φNΠt+1 +QN,t, (G.14)
where φN ≡ γf/(Nγm + γf ) and
QN,t = (ξ − φN )Et[Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
N(ξ2 − φ2N )Vart[Πt+1]. (G.15)
This fund’s investment profile given Rˆt is the one in Lemma 4.4 with φ and α/β replaced by φN and N ,
respectively:
θ(Rˆt) =
(
(1 + r)ξ2
ξ − φN
)
1
Rˆt
and X(Rˆt) =
(
ξ − φN
(1 + r)γmNξ3σ2R
)
Rˆ2t . (G.16)
Using (G.16), the certainty equivalent of each fund investor’s next-period wealth (given Rˆt) is
Uft = Et
[
W ft+1
]− γf
2
Vart
[
W ft+1
]
= (1− ξ)RˆtθtXt − ξ(1 + r)Xt + (1 + r)W − γ
m
2
N(φ− ξ2)θ2tX2t σ2R
=
(φN − ξ2)Rˆ2t
2Nγmξ2σ2R
+ (1 + r)W. (G.17)
Since dUft /dN < 0, the investors are worse off as the mass of investors in the fund increases. So, in
equilibrium, N must adjust so that Uft is equalized across all fund investors, i.e., N = α/β for all funds.
The intuition is the standard arbitrage argument: if there is a mass Ni of investors in fund i who achieve
higher Uft than those in fund j with mass Nj > Ni, then investors flee fund j (i.e., Nj decreases) and
flock to fund i (i.e., Ni increases) until Ni and Nj are equalized.
Likewise, using (G.16), the certainty equivalent of the manager’s next-period wealth (given Rˆt) is
Umt = Et
[
Wmt+1
]− γm
2
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
= NξRˆtθtXt +Nξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
N2ξ2θ2tX
2
t σ
2
R
=
(
1
2
+
ξ − φN
ξ2
)
Rˆ2t
γmσ2R
. (G.18)
Since dUmt /dN > 0, the manager is better off as more investors choose his fund. However, in our setting,
he is unable to attract investors by strategically influencing their fund choices. The reasons are twofold.
First, he cannot increase N by offering a fee schedule Ft(·), as the investors will set Ft(·) that is best
for them anyway. Second, at the time the investors choose funds, each manager cannot credibly commit
to choose θt in the interest of the investors: once the investors have been allocated to funds, it will be
optimal for the manager to renege on the promise he made and strategically choose θt as in Section 4.
G.4 Active funds and passive funds
In the model of Section 2, each manager chooses θt strategically to maximize his own expected utility.
Consequently, the fund invests in the riskless asset despite the fact that the investors can buy it on their
own. In reality, however, there are a number of passively managed funds, such as index funds, in which
the managers do not have discretion over portfolio choice: the investors effectively specify the number of
shares of the risky asset to hold, and typically do not allow the managers to buy the riskless asset.
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This section shows that our model can accommodate such funds too. We extend the model of Section
2 to have both “active funds,” in which the managers choose θt strategically as in Section 2, and “passive
funds,” in which each investor specifies the number of shares of (only) the stock to buy and the manager
passively fulfills it. In both types of funds, the managers can abscond as in Section 2. Each fund investor
can choose a fund to which to allocate capital.
In equilibrium, both types of funds coexist in the sense that they all attract positive mass of investors.
This result may sound counterintuitive, as it looks like the passive funds dominate the active ones from
the investors’ perspective. However, in our setting, the passive funds do not necessarily dominate the
active ones for the following two reasons. First, even the passive funds are subject to the same agency
problem that the managers can abscond. So, just like in the active funds, the passive funds’ investors also
incur agency costs by offering fee contracts to the managers to prevent them from absconding. Second,
although the investors in the passive funds are better off than those in the active ones when these funds
accommodate the same mass of investors, the investors’ expected utilities change as the allocation of
investors across funds change. Specifically, as shown below, as the mass of investors in a fund increases,
the investors in that fund are worse off. So, in equilibrium, the investors flow in and out of funds until
they become indifferent between any funds.
G.4.1 Setup
Section 2’s model is modified as follows. A mass ωβ of fund managers run active funds, and a mass
(1− ω)β of them run passive funds, where ω ∈ [0, 1] is an exogenous parameter. The letters a and p are
used to represent active funds and passive funds, respectively. Each active fund’s manager can choose θt
strategically as in Section 2. Each passive fund’s manager buys X/Pt shares of the stock given X dollars
of investor capital and does not buy the riskless asset. That is, from an investor’s perspective, allocating
X dollars of capital to a passive fund is equivalent to asking the manager to buy X/Pt shares of the stock
on her behalf. Each fund investor can choose a fund to which to allocate capital. In equilibrium, a mass
λα of fund investors invest in the active funds and a mass (1− λ)α of them invest in the passive funds,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is endogenously determined. In both types of funds, the investors offer fee contracts that
depend on the fund profits to the managers who can abscond with a fraction ξ of the fund assets. It is
not important that both types of funds share the same ξ. The result would be very similar if we assume
different ξ for each type.
G.4.2 Price conjecture
We conjecture and later verify that the equilibrium stock price is of the form
Pt = `δˆ − η
r
St, (G.19)
where ` and η are constants that are determined later. Given this conjecture, we have
Rˆt ≡ Et[Rt+1] = (1− r`)δˆ + ηSt (G.20)
and Vart[Rt+1] = σ
2
R ≡ σ2 + η2σ2s/r2.
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G.4.3 Fee contracts
There is a mass λαωβ of fund investors in each active fund, and
(1−λ)α
(1−ω)β in each passive fund. Thus, following
the same argument of Lemma 4.1, the fee schedule for each active fund is
F at (Π
a
t+1) = φ
aΠat+1 +Q
a
t , where φ
a ≡ ωβγ
f
λαγm + ωβγf
, Πat+1 ≡ Rt+1θtXat , and
Qat = (ξ − φa)Et[Πat+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xat −
γm
2
λα
ωβ
(ξ2 − φa2)Var[Πat+1], (G.21)
and the one for each passive fund is
F pt (Π
p
t+1) = φ
pΠpt+1 +Q
p
t , where φ
p ≡ (1− ω)βγ
f
(1− λ)αγm + (1− ω)βγf , Π
p
t+1 ≡ Rt+1
Xpt
Pt
, and
Qpt = (ξ − φp)Et[Πpt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xpt −
γm
2
(1− λ)α
(1− ω)β (ξ
2 − φp2)Var[Πpt+1]. (G.22)
G.4.4 Optimization problems
Before choosing Xt, each fund investor chooses a fund. For now, let us take this choice of fund as given,
and determine the optimal Xt. We consider her choice of fund later (in Section G.4.6), after characterizing
her expected utilities. Following Lemma 4.2, each active-fund investor’s optimal capital allocation is
Xa(θt; Rˆt) = max
{
(1− ξ)Rˆtθt − ξ(1 + r)
γm λαωβ (φ
a − ξ2)σ2Rθ2t
, 0
}
. (G.23)
Noting that θt = 1/Pt ∀t in passive funds, each passive-fund investor’s optimal capital allocation is
Xp(Pt; Rˆt) = max
 (1− ξ)
Rˆt
Pt
− ξ(1 + r)
γm (1−λ)α(1−ω)β (φ
p − ξ2)σ2R 1P 2t
, 0
 . (G.24)
As in Lemma 4.3, given Xat > 0, each active-fund manager chooses
θ(Xat ; Rˆt) =
ωβRˆt
γmλαξσ2RX
a
t
. (G.25)
From (G.23) and (G.25), each active fund’s Nash-equilibrium investment profile given Rˆt is given by
θ(Rˆt) =
(
(1 + r)ξ2
ξ − φa
)
1
Rˆt
and Xa(Rˆt) =
(
ωβ(ξ − φa)
(1 + r)γmλαξ3σ2R
)
Rˆ2t . (G.26)
Each direct investor’s optimal policy is the same as (3.3).
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G.4.5 Market clearing and belief consistency
The market clearing condition for the stock is
λαθ(Rˆt)X
a(Rˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
active funds’ demand
+ (1− λ)αX
p(Rˆt)
Pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
passive funds’ demand
+ (1− α)K(Rˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct investors’ demand
= St (G.27)
⇐⇒ Rˆt = k2
k1
`δˆ +
1
k1
(
σ2R − k2
η
r
)
St, (G.28)
where
k1 ≡ ωβ
γmξ
+
(1− ω)β(1− ξ)
γm(φp − ξ2) +
1− α
γd
and k2 ≡ (1− ω)βξ(1 + r)
γm(φp − ξ2) . (G.29)
For (G.20) and (G.28) to be consistent with each other, we need
1− r` = k2
k1
` ⇐⇒ ` = 1
r + k2k1
(G.30)
and
η =
1
k1
(
σ2R − k2
η
r
)
⇐⇒ η = r
2
2σ2s
(k1 + k2
r
)
±
√(
k1 +
k2
r
)2
− 4σ
2σ2s
r2
 . (G.31)
As discussed in Section 3.3, only the smaller root of (G.31) is relevant in the stable equilibrium. Since Rˆt
and Pt are affine functions of ηSt, the stock price dynamics are similar to those of the model of Section
2 with the value of η being replaced by (G.31).
G.4.6 Fund investor’s choice of fund
If a fund investor chooses an active fund, the certainty equivalent of her terminal wealth would be
Uaft ≡ Et[W aft+1]−
γf
2
Vart[W
af
t+1] =
(
ωβγf
λαγm+ωβγf
− ξ2
)
ωβ
2γmλαξ2σ2R
Rˆ2t + (1 + r)W. (G.32)
Here, we take Rˆt and Pt as given because each investor takes them as given when choosing a fund. If she
chooses a passive fund, the certainty equivalent would be
Upft ≡ Et[W pft+1]−
γf
2
Vart[W
pf
t+1]
=
(1− ω)β
2γm(1− λ)α
(
(1−ω)βγf
(1−λ)αγm+(1−ω)βγf − ξ2
)
σ2R
(
(1− ξ)Rˆt − ξ(1 + r)Pt
)2
+ (1 + r)W. (G.33)
As long as Uaft > (<)U
pf
t , investors flock to active (passive) funds and λ increases (decreases). The
adjustment of λ continues until every investor is indifferent between all funds, i.e., until Uaft = U
pf
t holds.
Such a critical level of λ exists in the interval (0, 1) because limλ→0 U
af
t =∞ and limλ→1 Uaf <∞ while
limλ→0 U
pf
t <∞ and limλ→1 Upf =∞.
The intuition for this result is the following. If λ→ 0, each active fund’s manager takes capital from
59
investors of measure 0. From this manager’s perspective, the investment risk is so small that he is willing
to bear all of it, that is, φa → 1 as λ → 0. If φa → 1, we have Qat < 0 (i.e., the investor receives Qat
from the manager); thus, the fund is risk-free from the investor’s perspective. So she chooses Xat → ∞,
leading to Uaft → ∞. This induces the investors to choose active funds, so λ increases. This decreases
φa, increasing each investor’s risk bearing and decreasing Uaft . Likewise, if λ→ 1, the passive funds are
risk-free for investors so Upft → ∞; but Upft decreases as λ decreases. At a critical level of λ ∈ (0, 1),
Uaft = U
pf
t holds and the investors are indifferent between any funds.
G.5 Allowing fund managers to invest capital
This section shows that fund managers would not invest their own capital in their funds even if they were
allowed to do so.
Suppose that each generation-t manager is born with an endowment of W ≥ 0 dollars, and chooses to
invest Zt ≥ 0 dollars (per investor) in his fund. That is, given Xt, he chooses θt ∈ (−∞,∞) and Zt ≥ 0 to
buy θt(Xt+Zt) shares of the stock per investor. The fund’s profit per investor is Πt+1 ≡ Yt+1−(1+r)Xt.
Recalling that there is a mass α/β of investors in his fund, the manager’s terminal wealth is
Wmt+1 =
α
β
Ft(Πt+1) + (1 + r)
(
W − α
β
Zt
)
, (G.34)
where the first term on the RHS is the total fees, and the second term is the proceeds from the riskless
asset. His terminal wealth if he absconds would be
W˜mt+1 =
α
β
ξYt+1. (G.35)
The fund investor’s and the direct investor’s budget constrains are the same as those of Section 2. The
optimal fee contract is still obtained in the form of Lemma 4.1.
Now, let us consider a manager’s problem. Under fee schedule Ft(·) of Lemma 4.1, his terminal
wealth (G.34) is rewritten as
Wmt+1 =
α
β
(
φΠt+1 + (ξ − φ)Et[Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1]− (1 + r)Zt
)
+ (1 + r)W,
which implies that the mean and variance of Wmt+1 are
Et
[
Wmt+1
]
=
α
β
(
ξEt[Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart[Πt+1]− (1 + r)Zt
)
+ (1 + r)W (G.36)
and
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
=
α2
β2
φ2Vart [Πt+1] . (G.37)
Since the manager has exponential utility, (G.36) and (G.37) imply that his maximization problem is
max
θt,Zt
Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
] ⇐⇒ max
θt,Zt
Et
[
Wmt+1
]− γm
2
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
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⇐⇒ max
θt,Zt
ξRˆtθt(Xt + Zt)− (1 + r)(1− ξ)Zt + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
ξ2θ2t (Xt + Zt)
2σ2R.
The FOC for θt is
Rˆt − γmα
β
ξθt(Xt + Zt)σ
2
R = 0, (G.38)
and the one for Zt is
ξRˆtθt − (1 + r)(1− ξ)− γmα
β
ξ2θ2t (Xt + Zt)σ
2
R ≤ 0, with equality iff Zt > 0. (G.39)
(G.38) and (G.39) imply that the LHS of (G.39) is −(1 + r)(1− ξ), which is negative. So we have Zt = 0.
That is, the manager would not invest his own capital in his fund even if he was allowed to do so.
The result holds because a manager can control the fund’s stock holding, θt(Xt + Zt), by choosing
two variables: θt and Zt. While choosing Zt > 0 entails an opportunity cost (i.e., he could invest it in
the riskless asset and earn 1 + r), choosing θt > 0 is costless. Thus, it is optimal for him to set Zt = 0
and use only θt to control the stock holding.
G.6 Fee contract space
In the model of Section 2, we assume that the fee Ft depends only on the fund profit, Πt+1. This
assumption is stronger than necessary: all the results (including the fee schedule) would be identical to
those of Section 4 even if we allow for a larger contract space that includes not only Πt+1 but also the
stock return Rt+1 and the fund portfolio’s total proceeds Yt+1.
To see this, let us allow the fee to depend on Rt+1, Πt+1, and Yt+1, and solve for the optimal fee
contract. The maximization problem is the same as the one presented in Appendix A. Since Rt+1 is the
only random variable in Rt+1, Πt+1, and Yt+1, the Lagrangian is (we omit time scripts)
L =
∫
uf (Π− F (R,Π, Y ) + (1 + r)W )h(R)dR− ψ
(
E
[
um(W˜m)
]
−
∫
um
(
α
β
F (R,Π, Y )
)
h(R)dR
)
,
where h(·) is the probability density function (conditional on t) of Rt+1, and ψ is the Lagrange multiplier.
The FOC for Ft(Rt+1,Πt+1, Yt+1) is
um′
(
α
βF (R,Π, Y )
)
uf ′ (Π− F (R,Π, Y ) + (1 + r)W ) =
β
α
1
ψ
. (G.40)
Log-differentiating (G.40) with respect to Rt+1, Πt+1, and Yt+1, we have
−γmα
β
(FR + FΠθX + FY θX) + γ
f (θX − FR − FΠθX − FY θX) = 0, (G.41)
−γmα
β
(FΠ + FY ) + γ
f (1− FΠ − FY ) = 0, (G.42)
and
−γmα
β
FY + γ
f (1− FY ) = 0, (G.43)
respectively, where Fj is the partial derivative of F (R,Π, Y ) with respect to j ∈ {R,Π, Y }. From (G.41),
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(G.42), and (G.43), we have FR = 0, FΠ = 0, and FY = φ, which imply that the optimal fee schedule is
Ft(Rt+1,Πt+1, Yt+1) = φYt+1 +Q
Y
t (G.44)
for some QYt that is known as of period t. The value of Q
Y
t satisfies the manager’s incentive compatibility
constraint (2.7) with equality:
Et
[
um(Wmt+1)
]
= Et
[
um(W˜mt+1)
]
⇐⇒ Et
[
Wmt+1
]− γm
2
Vart
[
Wmt+1
]
= Et
[
W˜mt+1
]
− γ
m
2
Vart
[
W˜mt+1
]
⇐⇒ α
β
(
φEt [Yt+1] +Q
Y
t
)− γm
2
α2
β2
φ2Vart [Yt+1] =
α
β
ξEt [Yt+1]− γ
m
2
α2
β2
ξ2Vart [Yt+1]
⇐⇒ QYt = (ξ − φ)Et [Yt+1]−
γm
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Yt+1] , (G.45)
which is different from Qt obtained in (4.2). However, plugging (G.45) into (G.44), we end up with the
same fee schedule as Lemma 4.1:
Ft(Rt+1,Πt+1, Yt+1)
= φYt+1 +
(
(ξ − φ)Et [Yt+1]− γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Yt+1]
)
= φ (Πt+1 + (1 + r)Xt) +
(
(ξ − φ)Et [Πt+1 + (1 + r)Xt]− γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Πt+1]
)
= φΠt+1 +
(
(ξ − φ)Et [Πt+1] + ξ(1 + r)Xt − γ
m
2
α
β
(ξ2 − φ2)Vart [Πt+1]
)
= φΠt+1 +Qt. (G.46)
Following similar steps, it is easy to show that the fee contracts depending on any one or two of
(Rt+1,Πt+1, Yt+1) would also result in (G.46). For example, if we allow Ft to depend on only Rt+1,
then the optimal proportional fee rate would be φθtXt and the fixed fee is Qt, so we have Ft(Rt+1) =
(φθtXt)Rt+1 +Qt = φΠt+1 +Qt, which is identical to (G.46).
G.7 Allowing managers to modify θt when absconding
In the model of Section 6, an implicit assumption is that each manager who absconds in period t is not
allowed to change the risk exposure of that period, θt. This section shows that the results would not
change even if we allow him to modify θt when absconding.
Let us assume that each manager can abscond with a fraction ξ of the fund portfolio and can change
that portfolio’s risk exposure from θt to θt + ∆t, where ∆t ∈ (−∞,∞) is his choice variable. That is, the
next-period wealth of an absconding manager, i.e., the counterpart of (F.3), is
W˜mt+1 = Rt+1(θt + ∆t)
α
β
ξXt + (1 + r)
α
β
ξXt + (1 + r)(W
m
t − cmt ). (G.47)
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Then, following the steps of Appendix F, we have
Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]
= Et
[
V˜ m(W˜mt+1, St+1)
]
= − exp
 −γmαβ ξ ((Rˆt + ηr qd1St) (θt + ∆t)Xt − γm2 αβ ξqd2(θt + ∆t)2X2t )
−γmαβ ξ(1 + r)Xt + 12 ln(1− qd1)− 12 q
d
1
σ2s
S2t − γm(1 + r)(Wmt − cmt )−Bd
 . (G.48)
On the one hand, the manager chooses θt to maximize Et
[
V m(Wmt+1, St+1)
]
, which is (G.48). On the
other hand, if he absconds, he chooses ∆t to maximize Et
[
V˜ m(W˜mt+1, St+1)
]
, which is also (G.48) due to
the binding IC. But since θt and ∆t appear in (G.48) only in the form of their sum, θt+∆t, the FOCs for
θt and ∆t are the same. Thus, the optimal level of the sum θt + ∆t is determined but its composition is
indeterminate. So ∆t = 0, which we assume in Section 6, is an equilibrium outcome, though not a unique
one. It is easy to show that if the manager incurs a (very small) adjustment cost for choosing ∆t > 0,
the unique outcome would be that he chooses ∆t = 0 and the same θt as in Section 6. The economic
intuition is the following. Since the IC is binding, each manager chooses θt as if he is maximizing the
outside option that he would obtain if absconding. Thus, he has no reason to change such a θt when he
actually absconds.
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